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INTRODUCTION 
It has traditionally been stated that intellectual property rights1 
(IPRs) and antitrust law conflict with each other.2  The conflict 
arises because intellectual property law creates and protects 
monopoly power, while antitrust law proscribes it.3  An additional 
explanation for this conflict stems from antitrust laws focus on 
attaining competitive market conditions not particular outcomes, as 
opposed to intellectual property laws preoccupation with ensuring 
the optimum amount of innovation.4 
Recently, regulatory regimes have tried to reconcile these 
conflicting objectives by emphasizing the common purpose of 
intellectual property law and antitrust law: promoting innovation and 
enhancing consumer welfare.5  This reconciliatory approach departs 
from the traditional view of IPRs as instruments of potential antitrust 
infringements.6  Despite commonalities, the intersection between the 
two bodies of law has produced heavy litigation.7  Attempts by U.S. 
courts to reconcile the conflict between IPRs and antitrust liability 
 
 1 Intellectual property rights encompass patents, copyrights, trademarks, know-how, 
trade dress, registered designs, plant breeders rights, and other similar related rights granted 
under national law, such as performance rights or broadcasting rights. 
 2 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th Cir. 
1997) [hereinafter Kodak II]. 
 3 Id. (quoting United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 
1981)). 
 4 David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer 
Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
771, 773-74 (1996). 
 5 See e.g., U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (April 6, 1995), reprinted in 4 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 [hereinafter IP Guidelines]; Debra A. Valentine, General 
Counsel of the FTC, Abuse of Dominance in Relation to Intellectual Property: U.S. 
Perspectives and the Intel Cases, (Nov. 15, 1999) (remarks at the Israel International 
Antitrust Conference), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvisraelin.htm (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 6 James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property 
Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 344 (1996). 
 7 See Michael H. Kauffman, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.: 
Taking One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights 
and Antitrust Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 471, 503-05 (1999). 
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have not reduced the legal uncertainty in this field of law.8  The two 
bodies of law make use of different methods in achieving their 
common goals.9  Antitrust law assumes that deterring monopolies 
will lead to the attainment of economic efficiency, while intellectual 
property law assumes that efficiency will be achieved only if 
regulators correctly estimate the proper mix of incentive and access 
to IPRs as needed to provide the optimal amount of innovation.10  As 
this essay explains, this uncertainty concerning the amount of 
incentives necessary to guarantee optimal innovation has proven 
problematic in the intellectual property law context.11 
This essay will examine the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine to refusals to license IPRs in the United States (U.S.) and 
the European Union (EU).  The application of the essential 
facilities doctrine to IPRs reflects the tension between antitrust law 
and intellectual property law.12  A complex issue in antitrust law 
concerns determining whether a refusal to license intellectual 
property by a company with market or monopoly power infringes 
Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community13 or 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.14 
 
 8 Compare Kodak II (affirming a jury verdict for ISOs against Kodak, ruling that a 
patent owners unilateral refusal to deal may violate antitrust laws where it is motivated by 
an anti-competitive purpose), with In re Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F. 3d 
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming a summary judgment in favor of Xerox, ruling that Xerox 
was under no obligation to sell or license its patented parts and did not violate the antitrust 
laws by refusing to do so). 
 9 Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 44 
ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 227-28 (Spring 1999). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See discussion infra. Section IV.A.2. 
 12 Cotter, supra note 9, at 235. 
 13 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 
3 (1997), [hereinafter EC TREATY] (incorporating changes made by TREATY ON EUROPEAN 
UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1.  Note that the EC TREATY was amended by the TREATY 
OF AMSTERDAM; see TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 
THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, 
Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM].  After the reform 
introduced by the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, Articles 85 and 86 of the EC TREATY have 
become Articles 81 and 82 respectively.  Note: European Community (EC) competition 
law refers to dominant position to describe what U.S. Antitrust Law refers to as market 
power.  This essay uses these terms interchangeably. 
 14 15 U.S.C. § 2  (1990). 
BACHES OPI.PP6 3/22/01  4:30 PM 
414 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:409 
 
This essay highlights the differences between the EU and U.S. 
approaches and analyzes the recent inroads antitrust law has had in 
the sacrosanct domain of IPRs on both sides of the Atlantic.15  Even 
though the prima facie elements to finding antitrust liability under 
the essential facilities doctrine are similar in the EU and U.S., the 
elements have been applied differently in their respective 
jurisdictions.16  Notwithstanding this difference, in both the EU and 
U.S. it is difficult to rely on the essential facilities doctrine to force a 
dominant owner to license its IPRs.17 
Section II of this essay analyzes the differing origins and 
approaches taken by the EU and U.S. authorities towards the 
essential facilities doctrine.  Section III discusses the application of 
the essential facilities doctrine to refusals to deal.  Section IV focuses 
on recent developments in the EU and U.S. in the application of this 
doctrine to refusals to license.  Section V comments on the 
shortcomings of the approaches taken by U.S. jurisprudence towards 
compulsory licensing and analyzes the alternative approaches 
proposed by scholars regarding the application of antitrust laws to 
refusals to license.  Finally, Section VI concludes that U.S. 
intellectual property (IP) holders who refuse to license their IPRs 
contend with more legal uncertainty than their European 
counterparts. 
I.  THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TOWARDS THE APPLICATION OF THE 
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IN THE EUROPEAN AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
In spite of its U.S. origins, the essential facilities doctrine now 
appears to be more important in EC competition law than in U.S. 
antitrust law.18  The essential facilities doctrine is applicable to a 
broader range of situations in the EU than in the U.S. and, therefore, 
 
 15 See Kobak, supra note 6, at 354-54. 
 16 Id. at 346-47. 
 17 See Cotter, supra note 9, at 235, 250. 
 18 See John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies Duties to 
Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, 18 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 437, 484-85 
(1994). 
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companies tend to rely more heavily on the essential facilities 
doctrine in the EU than in the U.S.19  Two main factors drive these 
different approaches to the use of the essential facilities doctrine: (i) 
the different development of the essential facilities doctrine in the 
EU and the U.S., and; (ii) the strong influence that the economic 
model proposed by the Chicago School20 has exerted upon U.S. 
antitrust agencies (the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice) and the judiciary.21 
The development of the essential facilities doctrine has been 
different in the EU and the U.S.22  As Section III.B explains below, 
EC competition law imposes upon dominant firms a general duty to 
share as well as a duty to supply.23  The existence of these 
obligations obviates the need to construe an essential facilities 
doctrine in the EU.  Contrariwise, the U.S. does not impose such 
general duties upon dominant firms.24  Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
does, however, prohibit monopolization and attempts to 
monopolize.25  Additionally, U.S. case law has relied on the essential 
facilities doctrine to create an exception to the general principle that 
firms do not have a duty to deal.26  Under this doctrine, the owners of 
an essential facility may be found to monopolize in the meaning of 
 
 19 James S. Venit & John J. Kallaugher, Essential Facilities: A Comparative Approach, 
1994 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 315, 333 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1995); Mercer H. Harz, 
Dominance and Duty in the European Union: A Look Through Microsoft Windows at the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine, 11 EMORY INTL L. REV. 189, 190 (1997). 
 20 The Chicago School of economics considers efficiency the fundamental goal to be 
achieved in the market.  This theory espouses the notion that businesses exist to maximize 
profit.  As such, the market compels businesses to make rational decisions that promote 
efficiencies.  Whereas competition secures market efficiencies, antitrust laws merely 
function to further support market created efficiencies.  In essence, this school of thought 
views the market as a self-correcting force that punishes individuals who pursue inefficient 
practices.  See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 925, 938-44 (1979). 
 21 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 344. 
 22 Harz, supra note 19, at 189-90. 
 23 See Lang, supra note 18, at 521; Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 332-33; 
Valentine Korah, The Ladbroke Saga, 3 EUR. COMP. L.R.  169, 174 (1998). 
 24 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 332-33. 
 25 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990). 
 26 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 316. 
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Section 2, unless they make the facility available to outsiders.27 
These differing approaches partly explain why practitioners find it 
easier to rely on the essential facilities doctrine in the EU as opposed 
to the U.S.28  Moreover, these differing approaches also explain in 
part the narrower approach taken by American courts in invoking the 
essential facilities doctrine only in extreme cases.29  Professor 
Areeda, concerned with the impact of this doctrine in reducing 
incentives to investment, identified those cases as examples of where 
a group of competitors acquires an existing bottleneck, such as what 
occurred in United States v. Terminal Railroad Association. 30 
Additionally, one should also consider that U.S. agencies and 
courts have been strongly influenced by the economists of the 
Chicago School.31  According to Chicago School economists, 
antitrust law should only concern itself with the efficient operation of 
the markets, without regard to sociopolitical objectives.32  In the EU, 
the European Commission (the Commission) has never been 
directly influenced by the theories of the Chicago School.33  Policy 
and social concerns command greater attention in EC competition 
law than in U.S. antitrust law.34  For instance, the outcome of the 
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd. v. Commission (Magill)35 case can be attributed 
to the subordinate consideration Europeans give market efficiency as 
compared to sociopolitical interests.36 
The EC Treaty places great emphasis on the sociopolitical 
objective of achieving an integrated economy throughout the 
 
 27 P. Ahern, Refusals to Deal After Aspen, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 166-82 (1994). 
 28 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 334-36. 
 29 See Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841-42 (1989); Korah, supra note 23, at 174. 
 30 See Areeda supra note 29 at 841-842; see generally United States v. Terminal R.R. 
Assn, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
 31 Harz, supra note 19, at 197.  See also supra text accompanying note 20. 
 32 Harz, supra note 19, at 197. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 
E.C.R. I-743. 
 36 Id.; see discussion infra Section IV.C.2 
BACHES OPI.PP6 3/22/01  4:30 PM 
2001] ARE IPRS STILL SACROSANCT? 417 
 
European Union.37  EC competition law functions as an instrument to 
bring about a common market.38  This goal of integrating the 
economies of the Member States of the EU has influenced how the 
Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as well as the 
European Court of First Instance (CFI) utilize the essential 
facilities doctrine.39 
Market integration may control the application of essential 
facilities in two ways.  First, with regard to the jurisprudence of EC 
Courts, concern for market integration affects how the courts 
interrelate EC Treaty40 provisions regarding the free movement of 
goods to the use of IPRs.41  It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
provide an analysis of this case law; however, it is important to note 
that this jurisprudence restricts the scope, and indirectly diminishes 
the value, of IPRs in the EU by having interpreted very broadly the 
doctrine of exhaustion of IPRs into the common market.42  
According to the exhaustion doctrine, it is contrary to Articles 28 
and 30 of the EC Treaty for an IP holder to assert its rights in one 
Member State to prevent parallel imports of patented products put in 
the market of another Member State by any of its licensees or with 
its consent.43  The exhaustion of IPRs is not unknown to U.S. law.  In 
the U.S., patents, trademarks and copyrights are subject to a first-
sale doctrine.44  An IP owner cannot ordinarily prevent or control 
the sale of goods bearing the mark once the owner has permitted 
those goods to enter commerce.45 
 
 37 Emmanuel P. Mastromanolis, Insights from U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and 
Restricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a New Legal Standard for European 
Union Competition Law, 15 U. PA. J. INTL BUS. L. 559, 562 (1995). 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. at 563. 
 40 EC Treaty, supra note 13, at arts. 28-30. 
 41 Mastromanolis, supra note 37, at 569. 
 42 Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147; see VALENTINE 
KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW & PRACTICE, §§ 8.1-.4 (6th ed. 
1997). 
 43 See Korah supra note 42§§ 8.1-.4. 
 44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. b. (1995); see also Adams 
v. Burke, 84  U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1874); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 44, at § 24 cmt. b. 
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In light of this jurisprudence  which erodes the usefulness of 
IPRs, namely, the right to exclude others from using or making the 
goods or services protected by those rights  it should come as no 
surprise that the Commission and EC Courts could broadly apply the 
essential facilities doctrine as a basis to compel the licensing of 
IPRs.46  For instance, the distinction between the existence of the 
IPRs and their exercise in Magill reflects the powerful influence 
continually exerted by the EUs concern for common market 
integration.47  The Commissions distinction between IPRs and their 
actual use enables it to subordinate nationally granted IPRs to the 
integrationist interests of the EU.48 
The second reason for the more prominent use of the essential 
facilities doctrine in the EU derives from the recent break-up of 
state-owned monopolies.49  The recent history of state-controlled 
industries in Europe, which the member states began to privatize in 
the 1990s, has left many more dominant positions in the EU than 
exist in the U.S.50  The doctrine of essential facilities is seen by the 
Commission as an additional antitrust instrument to deter companies 
and former incumbents from abusing their dominant positions.51 
 
 46 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 334-35. 
 47 See Ian S. Forrester, Magill, A Famous Victory? Third Party Access to Intellectual 
Property Rights, in 2 INTL INTELL. PROP. LAW & POLY, §§ 35-7 to 8 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 
1996). 
 48 Id. at §§ 35-5 to 10. 
 49 Harz, supra note 19, at 198 n. 65; Lang, supra note 18, at 483. 
 50 Harz, supra note 19, at 198 n. 65; Lang, supra note 18, at 483. 
 51 See Lang, supra note 18, at 483. 
BACHES OPI.PP6 3/22/01  4:30 PM 
2001] ARE IPRS STILL SACROSANCT? 419 
 
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE TO 
REFUSALS TO DEAL 
A. Overview 
1. Concept 
Neither EU nor U.S. law provides a legal definition of the essential 
facilities doctrine, and in both systems its contours are still unclear.52 
Some commentators have pointed out that the essential facilities 
doctrine is not so much a method of analyzing antitrust cases, but 
rather a useful label to describe the factual posture of cases.53  The 
essential facilities doctrine refers to a situation where a dominant 
firm owns or controls a facility that is indispensable to its 
competitors and refuses to grant access to that facility.54  An essential 
facility can be a product, like a raw material55 or a replacement 
part;56 a license of an intellectual property right;57 a service, such as 
access to a computerized airline reservation system;58 a harbor;59 
 
 52 Harz, supra note 19, at 221-23. 
 53 Lang, supra note 18, at 483 (noting that [e]ssential facility cases involve basic 
principles [and the] concept may be merely a useful label . . . rather than an analytical 
tool); PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBER HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 650-51 (Supp. 1995) 
(stating that [E]ssential facility is just an epithet . . . . It is not an independent tool of 
analysis, but only a label-a label that beguiles some commentators and courts into 
pronouncing a duty to deal without analyzing the implications . . . .). 
 54 See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 650-51. 
 55 E.g., Joined Cases 6 & 7/73R, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA et Commercial 
Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 0357. 
 56 E.g., Commission Decision 87/500/EEC Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 86 of 
the EEC Treaty (IV/32.279  BBI/Boosey & Hawkes Interim Measures), 1987 O.J. (L 286) 
36. 
 57 E.g., Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-485; Joined 
Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743. 
 58 E.g., Commission Decision 92/213/EEC Relating to a Procedure Pursuant to Articles 
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/33,544, British Midland v. Aer Lingus), 1992 O.J. (L 96) 
34; Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving a 
similar U.S. example). 
 59 E.g., Case IV/34.174, B&I Line PLC v. Sealink Harbour Ltd. & Sealink Stena Ltd., 5 
C.M.L.R. 255 (1992); Commission Decision 94/119/EC Concerning a Refusal to Grant 
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railway facilities;60 a football stadium;61 a power generation or 
telecommunication network;62 the landing and take off slots of 
airports;63 or an airport needed to provide ground services.64  The 
duty to provide access to the facility arises when the dominant firms 
competitor faces an insurmountable barrier of access to the market if 
deprived of access to the facility.65  Additionally, the duty to provide 
access arises when lack of access subjects competitors to a serious, 
permanent and inescapable competitive handicap that would render 
their activities uneconomical.66 
A degree of confusion exists concerning the relationship between 
the essential facilities doctrine and the monopoly leveraging 
doctrine.67  While the two doctrines often overlap,68 both theories 
 
Access to the Facilities of the Port of Rødby, 1994 O.J. (L 55) 52; Driscoll v. City of New 
York, 650 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (involving a similar U.S. example). 
 60 E.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Laurel Sand & 
Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1309 (D. Md. 1989), affd, 924 F.2d 539 
(4th Cir. 1991). 
 61 E.g., Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 848 F.2d 976 (9th 
Cir. 1988). 
 62 E.g., Commission Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access 
Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (C 265) 2.  A brief commentary 
on this Notice can be found in Sergio Baches Opi, Comunicación sobre la Aplicación de las 
Normas de Competencia a los Acuerdos de Acceso en el Sector de las Telecomunicaciones, 
654 Revista General del Derecho, 2517-18 (Mar. 1999); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) (concerning similar U.S. examples). 
 63 E.g., Commission Regulation 1617/93, 1993 O.J. (L 155) 18; Council Regulation 
95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1. 
 64 E.g., Commission Decision 98/190/EC Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of 
the EC Treaty, 1998 O.J. (L 72) 30. 
 65 See Lang, supra note 18, at 439. 
 66 See id. at 487; see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 
(9th Cir. 1991); Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 
1990); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Giles Meml Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488, 498 
(W.D. Va. 1994).  Perhaps because the essential facility doctrine is seen as a label to 
describe a factual situation, some commentators, especially in the U.S., have questioned 
whether this doctrine is necessary at all.  This school of thought argues that refusals of 
access that increase or maintain market power are already subject to attack as a group 
boycott, monopolization, or attempt to monopolize. See James R. Ratner, Should There Be 
an Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 327, 382 (1988); Areeda, supra note 
29, at 841. 
 67 In the U.S. the monopoly leveraging doctrine refers to those situations where a 
company uses its monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage or to 
monopolize or attempt to monopolize another market. U.S. courts have issued conflicting 
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could be distinguished in different ways.  First, the essential facilities 
doctrine represents one of three tests used to determine whether a 
monopolist has unlawfully refused to deal.69  In both the U.S. and 
EU, the plaintiff in an essential facility lawsuit must objectively 
prove that access to the facility is indispensable in order to 
 
decisions regarding the elements to prove a monopoly leveraging case.  The Second Circuit 
has ruled that a firm violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act merely by obtaining a 
competitive advantage in the second market, even in the absence of monopolization or an 
attempt to monopolize the leveraged market. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
603 F.2d. 263 (2d Cir. 1979).  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit rejected the monopoly 
leveraging doctrine set forth in Berkey and instead requires proof of defendants use of 
monopoly power in one market to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a monopoly in the leveraged 
market. See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d, at 544.  In the EU, the Commission and the EC 
Courts seem to have adopted a position similar to that held by the Second Circuit.  In Tetra 
Pak International SA v. Commission, the Commission found that Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty prohibits a firm with dominant position in one market from engaging in 
anticompetitive practices in a second market where the company does not enjoy dominant 
position if the second market has close associative links with the market in which the firm is 
dominant.  In this case, Tetra Pak was not dominant in the non-aseptic market for equipment 
and cartons for packaging liquids.  However, the Commission found that Tetra Pak had 
abused its dominant position in the markets for aseptic and non-septic equipment and 
cartons, inter alia, by requiring buyers of equipment for filling cartons with milk and fruit 
juice to buy the cartons from Tetra Pak.  Both the CFI and the ECJ upheld the 
Commissions decision.  See Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission., 
1994 E.C.R. II-755; Case 333/94P, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 
I-5951.  The ruling of the ECJ has been criticized by some scholars for failing to explain 
how the alleged links between the dominated and the non-dominated market allowed Tetra 
Pak to abuse its dominance in the non-dominated market.  See Valentine Korah, Tetra Pak 
II  Lack of Reasoning in Courts Judgment, 2 EUR. COMP. L.R. 98, 99 (1996).  Other 
commentators agree with the reasoning and holding of the ECJ.  See D.G. GOYDER, EC 
COMPETITION LAW 329 (1998). 
 68 See Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The 
Twisted Journey of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 5 (1996).  
For a practical example of this overlap, see, Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 69 Changes in pattern of dealing and the monopoly leveraging doctrine represent the 
other two tests.  See James B. Kobak, Jr., Antitrust Treatment of Refusals to License 
Intellectual Property, 566 PLI/PAT 517, 519 (1999).  See also Kezsbom & Goldman, supra 
note 68, at 5 explaining that: 
a helpful way of understanding the [essential facilities] doctrine is to view it as 
a branch of the law governing when a monopolist, or a group with aggregate 
monopoly power, has a duty to deal with competitors.  In practice, many cases 
cited as examples of the doctrines purported application actually represent 
traditional analysis that could have been approached utilizing some accepted 
Section 2 theory, such as monopoly leveraging, or abuse of monopoly power. 
Id. 
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compete in the market with the firm that controls the facility.70  The 
monopoly leveraging doctrine does not require such proof.71  
Because indispensability is difficult to prove, the monopoly 
leveraging doctrine offers plaintiffs better odds of success.72  Second, 
the two doctrines can be distinguished on the basis of the scope of 
the business justifications offered for refusing to deal.73  In an 
essential facilities dispute, business justifications appear to be limited 
to situations where access would disrupt the monopolists own 
business, whereas traditional monopoly leveraging situations 
accommodate broader business justifications.74 
Not withstanding the above, U.S. plaintiffs may face fewer 
obstacles when relying on the essential facilities doctrine because 
U.S. courts do not require that plaintiffs define the actual market 
involved.75  Moreover, relying on the essential facilities doctrine may 
make it is easier for plaintiffs to prove a general intent to monopolize 
or a specific intent to attempt to monopolize, as required by Section 
2 of the Sherman Act.76  U.S. plaintiffs can argue that mere denial of 
access to an essential facility indicates anticompetitive intent.77  It 
should be noted that Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp.78 (Aspen Skiing) could make the task of U.S. plaintiffs more 
difficult.79  In Aspen Skiing, the Supreme Court supplemented the 
intent to monopolize test by requiring plaintiffs to establish the 
existence of exclusionary or predatory conduct.80  In the EU, 
situations exist where use of the essential facilities doctrine to 
establish an Article 82 violation proves less onerous than reliance on 
 
 70 See Harz, supra 19, at 223. 
 71 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 318-19. 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 318-19. 
 75 See Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 
1975) (providing no analysis of relevant geographic market); Denver Petroleum Corp. v. 
Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 304-06 (D. Colo. 1969) (holding that proof of monopoly 
power and definition of the relevant market is unnecessary because of defendants ability to 
exclude competitors from the essential facility). 
 76 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 316-17. 
 77 See Kezsbom & Goldman, supra note 68, at 7. 
 78 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 79 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 317-18. 
 80 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 586 (1982). 
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the monopoly leveraging doctrine.81  Even in the absence of other 
factors typically required in monopoly leveraging cases  tying of 
sales, discrimination vis-à-vis another independent competitor, 
discontinuation of supplies to existing customers, or deliberate action 
to damage a competitor  the EU Commission has shown a 
willingness to view the mere act of refusing access to an essential 
facility an abuse.82 
A balancing test underlies the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine.83  Courts and antitrust authorities will require a dominant 
company to grant access to its facilities when the economic and 
social benefits for consumers in establishing higher levels of free 
competition in a particular market override the right of a company to 
choose those with whom it wants to deal.84  At times, however, 
consumer benefits could prove ephemeral, and the obligation 
imposed on a company to share its facility with competitors could 
adversely effect competition for the long-term.85 
Application of the essential facilities doctrine could be 
overbroad.86  Despite short-term gain to consumers in terms of price, 
quality and choice terms, use of the essential facilities doctrine could 
have a triple negative effect on competition in the long term.87  First, 
it would discourage competitors from developing alternative 
competing facilities.88  Second, it would reduce the incentive for 
dominant undertakings to introduce innovations in or duplicate their 
essential facilities.89  Third, since someone will have to determine the 
 
 81 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 332-35. 
 82 See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 130 at ¶ 
50 (1999). 
 83 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 337, n. 58. 
 84 Id. at 336-41. 
 85 See Lang, supra note 18, at 512-13; Areeda, supra note 29, at 852. 
 86 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 339, n. 65. 
 87 Areeda, supra note 29, at 851. 
 88 Of course, this is not the case when an incumbent passes a tipping point i.e., a 
degree of penetration that leads to a single network dominating the field.  In that event, there 
will be no viable alternative networks that can be established.  See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust 
Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th Century Discipline Addresses 21st Century 
Problems, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POLY. 129, 136 (1999). 
 89 See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
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terms of a compulsory access or license, it invites regulatory 
intervention.90  These three drawbacks particularly impinge on IPRs.  
Given the tendency to misrepresent IPRs as a monopoly, misuse of 
the essential facilities doctrine could be potentially damaging to the 
viability of IPRs.91 
2. The Basic Provisions 
To understand the U.S. and EU case law dealing with the essential 
facilities doctrine, one must examine the basic antitrust provisions 
courts utilize to evaluate it.92  In the EU courts analyze the essential 
facilities doctrine in cases concerning refusals to deal pursuant to the 
framework set forth under Article 82 of the EC Treaty.93  Article 82 
prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market, or in a substantial part of it, in 
so far as it may affect trade between Member States.94  Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, the relevant provision in the U.S., proscribes a 
person or a firm from monopolizing or attempting to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign 
nations.95 
 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 130 at ¶ 
57 (1999); Korah, supra note 22, at 174. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See Derek Ridyard, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors 
under UK and EC Competition Law, 17 EUR. COMP. L.R. 438, 445 (1996); In re 
Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135-36 (D. Kan. 1997), affd, 
203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 92 See generally Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19 (explaining how §§ 1, 2 of the 
Sherman Act and Article 82 of the EC Treaty serves as the proper point of departure in an 
analysis of the essential facilities doctrine because these statutes establish the parameters of 
the doctrines future development). 
 93 Id. at 325. 
 94 Article 82 was previously Article 86 under the EC Treaty of Rome before its revision 
pursuant to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
 95 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990).  Section 2 provides that: 
[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $10,0000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or 
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Commentators in the EU have tried to analogize Article 82 with 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.96  However, significant differences 
between these two provisions exist.97  First, Article 82 prohibits 
customer exploitation and exclusionary practices,98 while under 
Section 2, U.S. courts have emphasized the exclusionary practices 
against competitors by defendants.99 As United Brands v. EC 
Commission100 shows, Article 82 even prohibits abuses that may not 
advance the firms dominant position yet may cause direct harm to a 
single consumer or have an anticompetitive effect in markets in 
which the dominant firm does not compete.101 
It is important to note that in the essential facilities field the ECJ 
seems to have confined the application of Article 82 to those cases in 
which the defendants conduct is exclusionary, namely, to those 
cases in which the refusal to grant access to the facilities harms 
competition.102  Under this approach, harm to a single competitor in 
a market where there are other competitors does not necessarily harm 
competition.103  It is important to note that the language used by the 
Advocate General in Oscar Bronner represents a novel view in EC 
 
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court. 
Id. 
 96 See Harz, supra note 19, at 198. 
 97 See BARRY E. HAWK, 2 UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET & INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 743 (Supp. 1990) (discussing Article 86). 
 98 See CARLOS ESTEVA & STEPHEN RYAN, ARTICLE 82  ABUSE OF A DOMINANT 
POSITION 121 (Faull & Nikpay, ed., 1999).  In Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can v. 
Commission, the ECJ held that Article 82 is not only aimed at practices which may cause 
damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their 
impact on an effective competition structure.  Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. and Contl 
Can v. Commission., 1973 E.C.R. 215, 245 at ¶ 26 (1973). 
 99 See HAWK, supra note 97, at 743. 
 100 See Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 208, [1978] 3 
C.M.L.R. 83 (1978). 
 101 See ESTEVA & RYAN, supra note 96, at 121; HAWK, supra note 97, at 743. 
 102 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 328. 
 103 See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 132, at ¶ 
58 (1999) (holding that it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose 
of Article 86 [now Article 82] is to prevent distortion of competition  and in particular to 
safeguard the interests of consumers  rather than to protect the position of particular 
competitors). 
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competition law.104  The ECJ did not expressly refer to this statement 
of the Advocate General, but one can infer from its reasoning and 
holding in Oscar Bronner that the Court essentially agreed with the 
Advocate General.105 
Second, the policy objective of single market inherent 
throughout the EC Treaty also differentiates Article 82 from Section 
2 of the Sherman Act.106  Conduct such as geographic price 
discrimination may be condemned under Article 82 because it 
contributes to the partitioning of the common market, yet escapes 
Section 2 condemnation because it does not necessarily harm 
competition.107  The underlying thought is that there are situations, 
such as when investments involved significant sunk costs, where 
discrimination in accordance with what each geographic market can 
bear leads to increased product supply, and that therefore, society is 
better off than if price discrimination were forbidden.108 
Third, both provisions are aimed at regulating firms holding 
market power, but neither Article 82 of the EC Treaty nor Section 2 
of the Sherman Act prohibit dominance or monopoly power alone.109  
Section 2, however, goes one step further by also prohibiting 
attempts to monopolize a relevant market.110  To establish a 
monopolization or an attempt to monopolize claim under Section 2, 
one must evaluate the exclusionary conduct of the defendant that 
harms competitors - and thereby consumers - in terms of the 
products relevant market.111  A monopolization claim must be based 
upon the defendant having a substantial market power.112  The 
problem, however, is determining how much market power a firm 
must have in order to establish an attempted monopolization claim 
under Section 2.113  Market share requirements vary widely in such 
 
 104 See id. at 128, ¶¶ 45-46. 
 105 See id. 
 106 Mastromanolis, supra note 37, at 562-63. 
 107 Contra Commission Decision 80/1333, Hennesst-Henkell, 1980 O.J. (L 383) 11-15. 
 108 See Korah, supra note 23, at 172. 
 109 EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 82; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990). 
 110 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990). 
 111 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 447 (1993). 
 112 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990). 
 113 Id. 
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cases.114  Market shares between 47%-50% or between 50%-55% 
have been considered insufficient,115 but in other cases a 24% market 
share has been considered sufficient.116  Unlike an outright 
monopolization claim, an attempt to monopolize allegation does 
not require that plaintiffs establish that the dominant firm possesses 
market power.117  Therefore, a U.S. plaintiff can prevail in an 
attempted monopolization case against a company having a market 
share lower than the market share typically indicative of dominance 
under Article 82.118 
B. The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the European Union 
Application of the essential facilities doctrine in the EU dates back 
to the 1970s. 119  A detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
as well as the case law of the Commission dealing with essential 
facilities is beyond the scope of this essay.  It is necessary, however, 
to briefly touch upon landmark decisions of the ECJ and the 
Commission in this field to understand the different approaches 
taken in the EU and U.S. regarding the essential facilities doctrine. 
The ECJ has yet to make an explicit reference to the essential 
facilities doctrine;120 the sole instance of such a reference occurred in 
an Article 81 case before the Court of First Instance.121  A number of 
ECJ cases, however, dealing with refusals to supply goods or 
services by a dominant company implicitly rely on the essential 
 
 114 E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY & 
PROCEDURE 728 (1999). 
 115 See Ford v. Stroup, 1997 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,838 (6th Cir. April 23, 1997) 
(opinion unpublished); Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 
107-08 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 116 See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O.  Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1298 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
 117 See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 114, at 727. 
 118 See id. 
 119 E.g., Joined Cases 6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial 
Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 1 C.M.L.R. 309 (1974); Case 27/76, 
United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 83 (1978). 
 120 Lang, supra note 18, at 446. 
 121 Joined Cases T-374/4, T-375/94, & T-388/94, ENS, Eurostar, UIC, NS, SNCF v. 
Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141 (1998). 
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facilities doctrine.122  The two leading cases in this area have been 
Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents 
Corp. v. Commission (Commercial Solvents) 123 and United 
Brands Co. v. Commission (United Brands).124  These two cases 
reflect two distinct strands in the theory of abuse under Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty.125  Commercial Solvents is a monopoly leveraging 
case, while United Brands deals with selective refusals to deal.126 
In Commercial Solvents, the ECJ held that a company with a 
dominant position in the production of a raw material could not cease 
supplying an existing customer and competitor in the downstream 
market for derivatives of the raw material when the refusal would 
eliminate the competitor from the market.127  The ECJ found the 
defendants purported justification for its refusal to supply - that it 
would commence using the raw material to manufacture derivative 
products - unpersuasive.128 
In United Brands, the ECJ found that United Brands, the 
distributor of Chiquita bananas, abused its dominant position by 
cutting off supplies to a Danish ripener-distributor because the latter 
had begun advertising bananas of a competing brand.129  Unlike 
Commercial Solvents, the parties in this case were not in a 
competitive relationship.130  Despite this fact, the ECJ acknowledged 
that United Brands had a duty to continue supplying its Danish 
distributor.131  The ECJ took into account the impact that United 
Brands termination could have on the willingness of other 
customers to distribute competing brands as well as the need to 
preserve the independence of small and medium size firms in their 
 
 122 See e.g., Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH&Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH&Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 36 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1999). 
 123 Joined Cases 6-7/73, Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. 223. 
 124 Case 27/76, United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207. 
 125 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 328. 
 126 Joined Cases 6-7/73, Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. 223; Case 27/76, United 
Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207. 
 127 Joined Cases 6-7/73, Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. at 250-51. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Case 27/76, United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 217. 
 130 Id. at 216-17. 
 131 Id. at 207-08. 
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commercial position with a dominant company.132 
There are two main differences between United Brands or 
Commercial Solvents-type cases and normal essential facility cases.  
First, if a dominant company tries to deny access to a facility as a 
means of putting pressure on a competitor to compete less 
vigorously, it is likely to commit an abuse even if the facility is not 
essential.133  Second, in cases involving selective refusal of access 
as a way of discouraging aggressive competition, courts pay 
particular attention to special characteristics of the victim so as to 
determine how likely refusal will cause the firm to be discouraged 
from entering the market, to compete vigorously, or to be forced out 
of the market entirely.134 
The sweeping reasoning of the ECJ in United Brands and 
Commercial Solvents may explain why the ECJ did not refer 
expressly to the essential facilities doctrine in subsequent cases.135  
After Commercial Solvents and United Brands the general duty to 
supply was so well established that it was not necessary to 
distinguish essential facilities cases from other cases involving 
exclusionary conduct, although some of the latter cases may have 
been susceptible to essential facilities analysis.136 
The Commission first referred to the essential facilities doctrine in 
two interim decisions concerning access to the Welsh Holyhead 
Harbor in the Wales.137  In Sea Container v. Stena Sealink, the 
complainant wanted to compete with the defendant in the market for 
the transport of passengers and cars from Holyhead to Ireland.138  
Stena Sealink owned the port facilities of Holyhead.139  The 
Commission considered the port of Holyhead an essential facility 
because it was the only British port serving this market, with no 
 
 132 Id. at 208. 
 133 Lang, supra note 18, at 507. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 328-30. 
 136 See Lang, supra note 18, at 443. 
 137 Case IV/34.174, B&I Line PLC v. Sealink Harbour Ltd. & Sealink Stena Ltd., 5 
C.M.L.R. 255 (1992) (EC). 
 138 Id. at 260, ¶¶ 14-15. 
 139 Id. at 259, ¶ 12. 
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feasible alternatives available.140  The trip from the nearest available 
port, Liverpool, was twice the length of that from Dublin to 
Holyhead.141  The building of a new port was not economically 
feasible or physically possible.142  Stena Sealink had refused on 
several occasions to grant access to Sea Container to the port 
facilities on a non-discriminatory basis.143  The Commission 
concluded that Stena Sealink had abused its dominant position in the 
ferry market by refusing to give Sea Containers access to the port of 
Holyhead on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.144  In this 
case, however, the Commission did not have to order remedial 
measures because Stena Sealink finally consented to providing 
sufficient offers of additional slot times allowing plaintiffs to run a 
viable ferry service.145 
The Commission expanded upon the issue of leveraging market 
power from the essential facilitys market to the downstream 
market.146  According to the Commission, an undertaking which 
occupies a dominant position in the provision of an essential facility 
and itself uses that facility, and which refuses other companies 
access to that facility without objective justification, or grants access 
to competitors only on terms less favorable than those which it gives 
to its own services, infringes Article 82 of the EC Treaty.147 
 
 
 140 Id. at 265, ¶¶ 39-41. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 265, ¶¶ 63-65.  Some commentators have pointed out that the Commission was 
wrong by accepting that Liverpool was not an alternative to Holyhead.  N/E/R/A (NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES), OSCAR BRONNER: LEGITIMATE REFUSALS TO SUPPLY, 3-
4 (January 1999).  The Commission should have taken into account that, although the 
Liverpool route takes just over two hours more than the Holyhead route, the Holyhead 
passenger must drive for approximately 80 miles across North Wales after leaving the main 
motorway, whereas the Liverpool docks are well served by two major motorway routes.  Id.  
Indeed, the refusal of the Commission to grant interim measures led Sea Containers to 
inaugurate a new ferry service from Liverpool.  Id.  As of this writing Sea Containers 
continues servicing this route as advertised on its web-site.  See http://www.steam-
packet.com/timetables/fares-ssc.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 143 Case IV/34.174, B&I Line/Stena, 5 C.M.L.R. at 255, ¶ 66. 
 144 Id. at ¶¶ 76-78. 
 145 Id. at ¶ 79. 
 146 Id. at ¶ 66. 
 147 Id. at ¶¶ 41-42. 
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It is important to point out that, as the decision of the Commission 
in Stena Sealink shows, the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine does not require the parties to be in a competitive 
relationship.148  The Commission decided that it also applies when 
the potential competitor seeking access to the essential facilities is a 
new entrant into the relevant market.149 Years later, in Flughafen 
Frankfurt AG,150 the Commission appeared to go beyond Stena 
Sealink by holding that the obligation of the company controlling an 
essential facility to grant access to users of that essential facility also 
extends to potential operators who are not users of that infrastructure 
but who are willing to provide services to users of that 
infrastructure.151 
ECJ jurisprudence as well as the case law of the Commission has 
exhibited a flexible approach towards the essential facilities doctrine 
which has led complainants to rely on this doctrine as a pretext to 
gain access to facilities controlled by a dominant competitor even 
when access was not critical to a continued market presence.152  The 
ECJ has become aware of this increasing over reliance on the 
essential facilities doctrine.153  The judgment of the ECJ in Oscar 
Bronner,154 on November 26, 1998, serves as an attempt to limit the 
broad obligation of the doctrine.155 
Mediaprint, a publisher of two Austrian newspapers with a large 
market share,156 refused to grant its competitor Oscar Bronner access 
 
 148 See id. at ¶ 66; Case 27/76, United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 216-17. 
 149 See Case IV/34.174, B&I Line/Stena, 5 C.M.L.R. at ¶ 66. 
 150 Commission Decision 98/190/EC Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EC 
Treaty, 1998 O.J. (L 72) 30, 43.  In this case the Commission found that the Frankfurt 
Airport had abused its dominant position by refusing several airlines access to the airport to 
offer ramp ground services.  Id. 
 151 See Enrico Maria Armani, One Step Beyond in the Application of the Essential 
Facility Theory, 3 EC COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER 15, 18 (1999). 
 152 See Alan Overd & Bill Bishop, Essential Facilities: The Rising Tide, 4 EUR. COMP. 
L.R.  183, 183 (1998); Pat Treacy, Essential Facilities-Is the Tide Turning?, 8 EUR. COMP.  
L.R.  501, 504 (1998). 
 153 Pat Treacy, supra note 152, at 501. 
 154 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH&Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH&Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 36 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1999). 
 155 Pat Treacy, supra note 152, at 501. 
 156 Mediaprint at the time of suit controlled 46.8% of the Austrian daily newspaper 
market in terms of circulation and 42% in terms of advertising revenues.  Case C-7/97, 
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to its nationwide early-morning newspaper home-delivery 
network.157  According to Oscar Bronner, Mediaprint bore a duty to 
grant access to its distribution network because Commercial Solvents 
and its progeny require a dominant company to supply access to 
competitors in the downstream market unless refusal to supply can 
be  objectively justified.158  Oscar Bronner contended that the access 
requested was essential for its business since it was not economically 
feasible, due to the limited circulation of its newspaper, to establish 
its own distribution network.159 
The ECJ rejected Oscar Bronners arguments.160  Instead, the ECJ 
reconfigured its Commercial Solvents precedent by limiting the duty 
to grant access to instances where, pursuant to Article 82, access to 
the dominant companys goods or services is indispensable to the 
plaintiff companys ability to carry out its business and where the 
denial of access by the dominant company is likely to eliminate all 
competition.161 
Against this background, the ECJ found that Mediaprints 
distribution network did not qualify as an essential facility.162  First, 
it was undisputed that other distribution methods existed, like 
mailing, retail shops, and kiosks.163  The court ruled that even though 
these alternatives were less advantageous for the distribution of 
certain newspapers, this drawback proved insufficient to warrant 
treating Mediaprints distribution network as an essential facility.164  
Furthermore, the ECJ noted that no technical, legal, or economic 
obstacles existed that would make it difficult for any other publisher, 
alone or in partnership with other publishers, to establish its own 
nationwide home-delivery scheme.165  The ECJ endorsed the 
reasoning of Advocate General Jacobs holding that for such access to 
 
Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7794, ¶ 3. 
 157 Id. at I-7826, ¶ 23. 
 158 Id. at I-7826, ¶¶ 24-25. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at I-7831, ¶¶ 41-44. 
 161 Id. at I-7831, ¶ 41. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at I-7831, ¶ 43. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at I-7831, ¶ 44. 
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be regarded as indispensable, it would be necessary, at the very least, 
to establish the economic impracticality of creating a second 
newspaper home-delivery scheme with a circulation comparable to 
that of the existing scheme.166  According to Advocate General 
Jacobs, in assessing refusals to deal by a firm controlling an essential 
facility, it is important not to lose sight that the primary purpose of 
Article 82 is to prevent distortion of competition  and in particular 
to safeguard the interests of consumers  rather than to protect the 
interests of particular competitors.167  This implies that a refusal to 
grant access only amounts to an abuse of dominant position if it has 
an adverse impact on consumers.168  Such conduct will only have an 
adverse impact on consumers if the dominant firms final product is 
sufficiently insulated from competition to give it market power.169  
This reasoning is coherent with the ruling of the ECJ in Commercial 
Solvents, in which Commercial Solvents refused to continue 
supplying the raw material ethambutol to a former customer thereby 
threatening to deprive the market of one of ethambutols principal 
manufacturers.170 
The ECJs ruling in Oscar Bronner makes good sense from an 
economic and a legal standpoint.  Economically speaking, the 
decision proves sensitive to the danger of the chilling effect wrought 
by an overzealous application of the essential facilities doctrine to 
innovative initiatives.171  The decision also recognizes that the 
primary concern of antitrust law is to safeguard consumer welfare, 
rather than to protect particular competitors.172  From a legal 
perspective, the decision bestows greater legal certainty concerning 
the conditions necessary to a finding of liability under the essential 
facilities doctrine.173  In particular, the ECJ clarified its previous 
 
 166 Id. at I-7832, ¶ 46. 
 167 Id. at I-7811, ¶ 58. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See Joined Cases 6 & 7/73R, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA et Commercial 
Solvents Corp. v. Commission., 1973 E.C.R. 0357, ¶ 25. 
 171 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7812, ¶ 63. 
 172 Id. at I-7811, ¶ 58.  Notice that the U.S. Supreme Court has also considered consumer 
welfare as the ultimate goal of antitrust law.  See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 
(1997); Intergraph Corp. v Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 173 See Pat Treacy, supra note 152, at 501-04. 
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jurisprudence by adding that a facility is only indispensable to the 
business when no actual or potential substitutes exist.174  A plaintiff 
must prove a facility to be indispensable before a court will compel 
the controlling firm to provide access. 175 
The ruling of the ECJ may also be interpreted as a warning to 
those competitors seeking to operate as free riders of the dominant 
firms assets.176  Reliance on the essential facilities doctrine as a 
pretext to gain access to a competitors facilities, merely because 
they are more advantageous than ones own, fails to trigger Article 
82 remedial provisions.177 
Oscar Bronner shares the same philosophical underpinnings and 
skepticism about a broad application of the essential facilities 
doctrine as a previous decision of the CFI in an Article 81 case.  In 
European Night Services Ltd. and Others v. Commission (ENS),178 
the CFI quashed a Commission decision in part on the grounds that 
the Commission had misapplied the essential facilities doctrine when 
granting an exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty to an 
agreement between several railway companies operating a night 
passenger service between the U.K. and different cities in other EU 
countries.179  This new service emerged as a result of the 
construction of the tunnel linking the U.K. to the European 
continent.180 
The CFI found that the railway companies did not enjoy a 
dominant position in the relevant market.181  The CFI noted that ENS 
market share in the relevant market (business travelers and leisure 
travelers in the routes in question) did not exceed 7% to 8%.182  The 
CFI ruled that even if the parties had dominant positions in the 
 
 174 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7832, ¶¶ 45-46. 
 175 Id. at I-7832, ¶ 46. 
 176 See Pat Treacy, supra note 152, at 501-04. 
 177 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7832, ¶ 46. 
 178 Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94 & T-388/94, European Night Servs. Ltd and Other 
v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141 (1998). 
 179 Id. at II-3223, ¶¶ 206-07. 
 180 Id. at II-3153, ¶¶ 212-13. 
 181 Id. at II-3226, ¶ 215. 
 182 Id. at II-3225, ¶ 212. 
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passenger transportation market between the routes in question, the 
essential facilities doctrine did not justify imposing on the railway 
companies the duty to supply slots, locomotives, and crews to third 
parties.183  Thus, the CFI found that the Commission erred in 
applying the essential facilities doctrine given the existence of other 
alternative providers, neither locomotives nor crews could be 
considered essential.184  Likewise, the CFI found that the slots in 
question were not essential since there were enough alternative slots 
available.185 
In summary, Oscar Bronner can be read as a corrective measure 
by the ECJ to narrow what had been a broad approach to refusal to 
deal cases.  It also narrows the scope of the Commissions 
interpretation of the duty to deal found in such earlier decisions as 
London European/Sabena, a decision which future jurisprudence will 
have to clarify.186 
C. The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in the United 
States 
1.  The Essential Facilities Doctrine After Aspen Skiing 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a thorough 
understanding of the development of the essential facilities doctrine 
in the U.S.187  A brief reference to United States v. Terminal 
 
 183 Id. at II-3228, ¶ 221. 
 184 Id. at II-3225, ¶¶ 212-13. 
 185 Id. at II-3223, ¶¶ 207-08. 
 186 Commission Decision No. 88/589/EEC, O.J. (L 317) 47 (London European-Sabena).  
The Commission condemned Sabenas refusal to grant London European access to its 
computerized reservation system.  Id.  The Commission found that Sabena enjoyed a 
dominant position in the Belgium market for computerized reservation systems and that 
access to these systems was of capital importance for all companies seeking to operate 
competitively in the Belgium market.  Id. at ¶ 26.  Some commentators have suggested that 
this case was wrongly decided since the Commission did not look at Sabenas position in 
the airlines market to determine whether the potential exclusion of London European from 
this market would have had any significant impact or harm in the relevant market. See Venit 
& Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 333. 
 187 For a thorough and recent outline of this development consult Abbott B. Lipsky & J.  
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Railroad Association188 and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States189 
cases shed light on the development of the doctrine in the U.S.  
Although the actual expression essential facilities does not appear 
in any reported judicial decision until 1977,190 the doctrine originated 
in Terminal Railroada case brought under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.191 Six railroads formed the Terminal Railroad 
Association (the Association).192  The Association acquired, 
among other facilities, the bridge connecting St. Louis with the other 
side of the Mississippi River.193  The bridge was essential for railroad 
companies terminating on either side of the river.194  Contrary to 
arguments proffered by federal antitrust authorities, the Supreme 
Court did not dissolve the Association, but ordered it to either open 
membership to all railroads or grant non-members reasonable access 
to the bridge.195  While not a refusal to deal case, Terminal Railroad 
concerned the anticompetitive effects of the agreement among the six 
railroads and the groups actual monopolization of the bridge.196 
Otter Tail represents the high-water mark of the essential facilities 
doctrine in the U.S. and courts frequently quote from it.  The case 
marks the first time that the Supreme Court confronted the essential 
facilities doctrine in the context of a refusal to deal.197  Otter Tail 
held a regulated monopoly for electric power distribution in the 
upper Midwest, and also distributed electricity at the retail level in 
four-hundred and sixty-five towns.198  Several communities supplied 
by Otter Tail built their own generation facilities and sought to 
establish their own grid by obtaining power from Otter Tail at 
 
Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999). 
 188 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
 189 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 190 Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 187, at 1194. 
 191 J. GIFFORD & LEO J. RASKIND, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW CASES & MATERIALS 393 
(1998). 
 192 Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 391. 
 193 Id. at 391-92. 
 194 Id. at 392-93. 
 195 Id. at 409-11. 
 196 Id. at 410. 
 197 James C.  Burling, William F.  Lee & Anita K. Krug, The Antitrust Duty to Deal and 
Intellectual Property Rights, 24 J. CORP. L. 527, 530 (1999). 
 198 Otter Tail Power Co.  v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973). 
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wholesale rates.199  Otter Tail refused to supply wholesale power to 
these communities and it sought to prevent them from gaining access 
to alternative suppliers.200  The U.S. Department of Justice (the 
DOJ) sued Otter Tail alleging monopolization of the retail power 
market by unlawful use of its monopoly power in the electricity 
transmission market.201  The Supreme Court ruled that Otter Tail had 
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act and confirmed the order of the 
District Court requiring Otter Tail to supply wholesale power to the 
communities.202 
Following Otter Tail, the essential facilities doctrine enjoyed a 
growing popularity as many firms relied on it despite its impractical 
nature.203  This was the situation until Aspen Skiing,204 in which the 
Supreme Court confined the doctrine to far more limited 
situations.205  Aspen Skiing dealt with the refusal by Aspen Skiing, 
the owner of three ski resorts in Aspen, Colorado to continue to 
jointly market an all-Aspen ticket program together with the owner 
of the fourth resort, Aspen Highlands.206 This program afforded 
skiers the opportunity to access four skiing resorts with a single 
ticket.207 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict that Aspen Skiing 
monopolized the Aspen ski market on two grounds.208  First, the 
Tenth Circuit held that the all-ticket scheme was an essential 
facility.209  Second, it found sufficient evidence to support the claim 
that Aspen Skiing intended to drive Aspen Highlands out of the 
 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 371. 
 201 Id. at 368-69. 
 202 Id. 
 203 See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 187, at 1192. 
 204 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); see 
also Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 187, at 1206 (commenting on the significance of Aspen in 
the development of Section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
 205 Herbert Hovenkamp, Intellectual Property Rights and Federal Antitrust Policy, 
Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 477, 481 (1999). 
 206 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589. 
 207 Id. at 589. 
 208 Id. at 599. 
 209 Id. 
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market.210  The Tenth Circuit considered Aspen Skiings purported 
business justification invalid.211  Aspen Skiings dismissive treatment 
of alternative ways of making Aspen Highlands tickets compatible 
with Aspen Skiing tickets also influenced the Circuit Courts 
decision.212  The Supreme Court found that Aspen Skiing had 
monopoly power and maintained such monopoly power through 
exclusionary acts.213  Yet, despite confirming the decision of the 
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found application of the 
essential facilities doctrine unnecessary.214 
The Supreme Courts ruling in Aspen Skiing established that a 
refusal to deal by a monopolist violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
when such refusal produces an important change in a pattern of 
distribution that cannot be justified by normal business purposes.215  
By ignoring the essential facilities doctrine, the Supreme Court 
rejected it as the controlling law in unilateral refusal to deal cases 
and thereby endorsed the application of traditional Section 2 
principles to such cases.216  Since Aspen Skiing, some courts have 
been reluctant to apply the essential facilities doctrine when the 
alleged anti-competitive conduct may be assessed as monopolization 
or attempt to monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.217 
In Eastman Kodak Co.  v. Image Technical Servs. Inc. (Kodak 
I),218 after rejecting respondents argument that the essential 
facilities doctrine was the controlling law in unilateral refusals to 
deal, the Ninth Circuit relied on Aspen Skiing and held that Section 2 
of the Sherman Act prohibits a monopolist from refusing to deal in 
 
 210 Id. at 599. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 599. 
 213 See id. 
 214 Id. at 611, n. 44. 
 215 Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak 
Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 503 (1999). 
 216 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600-05. 
 217 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991); McKenzie 
v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988); Soap Opera Now, Inc. v. Network Publg 
Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Trans. Inc., 
924 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1991); Illinois ex rel & Burris v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 935 
F.2d 1489 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 218 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
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order to create or maintain a monopoly absent a legitimate business 
justification.219  The Ninth Circuit emphasized the change of pattern 
effect to find Kodak in violation of Section 2 for refusing to continue 
to sell replacement parts to independent service providers.220 
The same reasoning may be found implicitly in Intergraph Corp. 
v. Intel Corp.,221 in which Intel was found guilty of a Section 2 
violation for refusing to continue licensing to one of its customers 
secret business information regarding its new products.222  On 
appeal, the Intel court refused to apply the essential facilities doctrine 
to a refusal by a supplier to provide secret technical information to 
one of its customers.223  The court found that the plaintiff and the 
defendant were not competitors in any of the relevant markets and, 
contrary to the plaintiffs submission, considered the presence of a 
competitive relationship a prerequisite to invoking the essential 
facilities doctrine under the Sherman Act.224 
2.  The Main Differences between the United States and the 
European Union Systems 
The essential facilities doctrine has received a more structured 
analysis in the U.S. than in the EU.  U.S. courts have set forth a four-
part test to determine whether a refusal to deal involving an essential 
facility constitutes an illegal monopolization contrary to Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act.  In MCI Communications Corp. v AT&T,225 the 
court established the following as elements of the test: (i) control of 
 
 219 Id. at 460-61; see also Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1211. 
 220 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1211; see also PSI Repair Servs. Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 
F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 1997). (contributing to Aspen Skiing and Kodak II the rule that a 
monopolist is allowed to make a blanket refusal to deal to its potential competitors provided 
that the defendant has not changed its commercial policy after locking-in some of its 
customers). 
 221 3 F. Supp.2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998). 
 222 Id. at 1279. The district court decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.  See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
On remand the district court granted Intels motion for summary judgment.  See Intergraph 
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2000). 
 223 Intel, 195 F.3d at 1356-57. 
 224 Id. 
 225 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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an essential facility by a monopolist; (ii) competitors inability 
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (iii) 
refusal to grant access to the facility, and; (iv) the feasibility of 
providing the facility.226  Although neither the EC courts nor the 
Commission have established a similar four-part test, these elements 
are implicitly incorporated in the reasoning of the EC courts and of 
the Commission when they deal with an essential facilities case.227 
While the concept of essential facility is similar on both sides of 
the Atlantic, significant differences exist between the approaches 
taken by antitrust authorities towards the essential facilities doctrine.  
These differences are significant enough to merit the attention of an 
in-house counsel or an attorney advising a U.S. or EU firm on the 
circumstances under which it can lawfully refuse to license to actual 
or potential competitors.  In particular, legal practitioners must take 
into account factors such as whether the owner of the facility and the 
competitor to whom access is refused compete in the downstream 
market or whether the justification for the refusal to license is going 
to be accepted by both competition authorities.228 
The first significant difference between both regimes is that, as the 
Intel case229 shows, the application of the essential facilities doctrine 
by U.S. courts appears to be limited, at least in monopoly leveraging 
cases, to those situations where the party controlling the essential 
facility has market power in a downstream market.230  In contrast, in 
the EU, possession of market power in the downstream market, 
despite being relevant, is not an essential element for reliance on the 
essential facilities doctrine.231  This divergent treatment may be 
 
 226 Id.; Kobak, supra note 69, at 522-23; Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 323-24 
(referring to an analysis of these elements in Norman W.  Hawker, Open Windows: The 
Essential Facilities Doctrine and Microsoft, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 115, 120-21 (1999)). 
 227 E.g., Joined Cases 6 & 7/73R, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA et Commercial 
Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 0357; Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co 
KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, 
[1998] 36 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1999); Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94 & T-388/94, European 
Night Servs. Ltd and Other, v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141 (1998). 
 228 See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 334, 344. 
 229 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 230 Alaska Airlines v. United States, 948 F.2d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 1991).   
 231 Lang, supra note 18, at 478; see also Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 333. 
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explained by the fact that Article 82 imposes broader duties to deal 
on dominant companies than Section 2 of the Sherman Act.232 In his 
opinion in the Oscar Bronner case, Advocate General Jacobs 
summed up the actual state of EC competition law in this area as 
follows: 
[A] dominant undertaking commits an abuse where, 
without justification, it cuts off supplies of goods or 
services to an existing customer or eliminates competition 
on a related market by tying separate goods and services.  
However, it also seems that an abuse may consist in a 
mere refusal to license where that prevents a new product 
from coming on a neighboring market in competition 
with the dominant undertakings own product on that 
market.233 
It is also considered easier to generate a business justification for a 
refusal to deal in the U.S. than in the EU.234  U.S. courts accept 
business justifications based on technical, commercial or efficiency 
grounds as legitimate reasons for refusing access to an essential 
facility.235  In contrast, the jurisprudence of the EC Courts and the 
case law of the Commission provide little guidance as to what types 
of business justifications constitute legitimate defenses.236  Despite 
the foregoing, case law suggests that EC courts and antitrust officials 
would favorably consider common defenses relied upon by 
 
 232 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 333.  Stating that: 
In the United States the essential facility doctrine focuses on effects in markets where a firm 
holds market power subject to control under Section 2.  The Article 86 [now Article 82] 
cases, in contrast, appear to apply the concept in a monopoly leveraging context without 
extensive consideration of the extent to which the dominant firms holds a dominant position 
in the downstream market. 
Id. 
 233 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, I-7806 ¶ 43, [1998] 36 C.M.L.R. 
1289 (1999). 
 234 See Lang, supra note 18, at 478. 
 235 See, e.g., Oahu Gas Serv. Inc. v. Pacific Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 368 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(a monopolist refusal - in this case the sole producer of propane gas in Hawaii - to aid a 
competitor was not found in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act because the 
investment required of the defendant to expand production to accommodate the entry of the 
competitor would have resulted in a negative return). 
 236 Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 317; Lang, supra note 18, at 522. 
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companies controlling essential facilities before U.S. courts.237  Such 
defenses range from taking advantage of economies of scale, the risk 
of having negative returns if access were granted, serious congestion 
in the facility, or safety considerations.238 
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A. When Refusals to License Intellectual Property Rights and 
Antitrust Law Conflict? 
1.  Overview 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty as well as Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act may only be violated if a firm possesses market or monopoly 
power.239  IPRs confer a monopoly on the proprietor to the extent 
that the proprietor is insulated from the competitive exploitation of 
its invention.240  In the EU and U.S., however, mere ownership of an 
IPR does not confer a dominant position.241 An IP owner holds a 
dominant position only if sufficient substitutes of the protected 
product or service in the relevant market do not exist.242  Therefore, 
the tension between intellectual property and antitrust law arises in 
refusal to license cases only when an IPR confers dominant power to 
 
 237 See supra note 227. 
 238 Id. 
 239 ESTEVA & RYAN, supra note 98, at 119; ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, 
ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 94 (1994). 
 240 Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 537. 
 241 E.g., Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. I-6211, ¶ 8; 
Joined Cases C-241/91 and C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission., 1995 E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 
46; Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. 
Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  This jurisprudence is consistent with the IP 
Guidelines which state that U.S. agencies will not presume that a patent, a copyright or a 
trademark necessarily confers market power upon its owner.  IP Guidelines, supra note 5, at 
¶ 2.2. 
 242 Id. 
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its proprietor in the relevant market.243 
The central question in the conflict between intellectual property 
and antitrust law is whether refusals to license in an IPR context 
should be treated like any case involving refusal to deal by a 
dominant firm.244  The answer to this question raises a number of 
policy issues.  These issues concern the difficult task of balancing 
interests, like the full exploitation of IPRs to generate new 
technology in an ever-increasing competitive market, and the need to 
preserve free competition in the market.245  These objectives are 
often in conflict with one another.246  Strict adherence to antitrust 
policy may discourage future investments in innovation, leading to a 
loss of competitiveness of local industry in a global economy, 
especially in strategic economic sectors such as pharmaceuticals, 
aircrafts, or computer software.247  On the other hand, granting 
immunity to IPR holders from antitrust laws may lead to 
unreasonable levels of monopoly power.248 
2. Theories Proposed to Solve the Intellectual Property 
Law/Antitrust Law Conflict 
Different theories have been construed to answer the question 
posed in the previous section.  These theories reflect different 
approaches used to achieve an optimal balance between intellectual 
property and antitrust laws.  One approach advocates granting 
companies antitrust immunity for the use of IPRs.249  Because 
intellectual property law expressly authorizes refusal to license IPRs, 
a companys decision not to license its IPRs should be immune from 
antitrust liability.250  The traditional misuse doctrine would provide 
the only exception to this antitrust immunity for refusals to license 
 
 243 See Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 535. 
 244 Id. at 528; SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations 
omitted). 
 245 See GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 191, at 677. 
 246 See Richard C.  Levin, Patents in Perspective, 53 ANTITRUST 519, 522 (1984). 
 247 GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 191, at 677-78. 
 248 See GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 191, at 677. 
 249 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 188-97. 
 250 Id. at 189-90. 
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IPRs.251  The advocates of this view argue that antitrust laws threaten 
the efficiency of the economic incentives IPRs afford.252  By 
granting the power to exclude others, legislators have assumed that 
no antitrust violation can occur.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit endorses this approach.253 
A second school of thought believes that the antitrust-immunity 
approach is flawed.254  It is undisputed that the aim of IPRs is to 
encourage and reward innovation.255  However, pro-competition 
proponents claim that the right to recover research and development 
(R&D) investments and obtain a reward should not be 
boundless.256  Many situations exist where the exercise of IPRs 
stands to produce anti-competitive effects in the market important 
enough to outweigh the benefits that arise from the antitrust 
immunity granted to IPRs.257  Excluding a competitor by denying 
access to a patent might allow sellers to raise their products price by 
X amount, but compulsory licensing might deprive consumers of Y 
efficiencies per unit.258  Therefore, a full evaluation of gains and lost 
efficiencies is required.259 
This second approach attempts to reconcile intellectual property 
law with antitrust law by limiting the application of antitrust law to 
refusals to license IPRs to exceptional circumstances.  In the U.S., 
federal agencies and the Ninth Circuit have endorsed this view.260  
 
 251 See Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 533; In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust 
Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1139-40, affd, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 252 In re Indep. Serv. Org, 989 F. Supp. at 1135-36. 
 253 Id. 
 254 See Mark R. Patterson, When is Property Intellectual?: The Leveraging Problem, 73 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1133. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1813, 1818 (1984). 
 257 See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE & ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 660 (3rd ed. 1990) (discussing how misallocation of resources is a social 
harm of monopoly power). 
 258 Kaplow, supra note 256, at 1819. 
 259 See Pitofsky, supra note 88, at 139. 
 260 According to R. Pitofsky, a cautious approach is called [for the application of 
antitrust laws to high-tech industries]. But abandoning antitrust principles in this growing 
and increasingly important sector of the economy seems like the wrong direction to go.  
Id.; see also Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of 
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The IP Guidelines embody the principle that, for the purpose of 
antitrust analysis, federal agencies regard intellectual property as 
akin to any other form of property.261  The Commission and the EC 
Courts have taken similar positions.262  Several theories have given 
life to this second approach. 
For instance, the Ninth Circuit has followed this approach by 
holding that the desire of an IP holder to exclude others from its 
intellectual property is a presumptively valid justification for 
leveraging.263  The Ninth Circuit adopted the presumption 
approach because it was concerned with the negative effects on 
innovation of widening the standard of antitrust liability to include 
some unilateral practices regarding the use of IPRs.264  Alternatively, 
Professor Kaplows argues that since the ultimate question to be 
answered relates to the proper incentives for IP owners or potential 
IP holders, the ideal method to determine whether an IP owner has 
infringed antitrust law is to analyze each alleged misconduct under a 
ratio test.265  Such a test compares the patentees reward with the 
 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001) 
(concerning a speech delivered before the American Antitrust Institute Conference: An 
Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century on June 15, 2000). 
 261 See IP Guidelines, supra note 5, at ¶ 2.1. 
 262 See GOYDER supra note 67, at 351-59. 
 263 Kodak II, 125 F.3 at 1211. 
 264 Id.  Unilateral conduct is the most common conduct in the economy.  Id.  After 
Kodak II, unilateral conduct by a manufacturer in its own aftermarkets may give rise to 
liability and, in one-brand markets, monopoly power created by patents and copyrights will 
frequently be found.  Id.  Under current law the successful defense of monopolization claims 
will rest largely on the legitimacy of the asserted business justifications, as evidenced by the 
jury instructions approved in Aspen Skiing.  Id.  As the Kodak II court stated: 
Without bounds, claims based on unilateral conduct will proliferate. The 
history of this case demonstrates that such claims rest on highly disputed 
factual questions regarding market definition. Particularly where treble 
damages are possible, such claims will detract from the advantages lawfully 
granted to the holders of patents or copyrights by subjecting them to the cost 
and risk of lawsuits based upon the effect, on an arguably separate market, of 
their refusal to sell or license. The cost of such suits will reduce a patent 
holders incentive . . . to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, 
research, and development. 
 Id.  at 1218 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)). 
 265 Kaplow supra note 256 at 1842. 
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monopoly loss imposed on society.266 
The antitrust immunity approach and the approach adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit have been criticized as too simplistic.267  According to 
some authors, these approaches fail to make a real attempt to 
determine the proper balance between the social benefits that stem 
from the creation of intellectual property and the social cost of 
monopoly overcharges.268  The antitrust-immunity approach avoids 
this dilemma by overlooking the need to keep a proper balance 
between the main interests of intellectual property law (ensuring a 
proper reward to IP holders in order to encourage innovation) and the 
public interest of enhancing free competition.269  In other words, this 
approach overlooks the fact that IPRs grant a privilege serving a 
public purpose.270  Intellectual property law grants monopolies in 
order to provide an incentive for the creation of inventions.271  These 
monopolies are limited, because the goal of the law is to create the 
incentive while imposing no higher a monopoly cost than is 
 
 266 Id. 
 267 See Patterson, supra note 254, at 1140. 
 268 Kaplow, supra note 256, at 1845-49; Patterson, supra note 254, at 1138-39. 
 269 See supra note 268. 
 270 Patterson, supra note 254, at 1139; see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. 
Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944). 
 271 See e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112 (1994) (concerning patent law where statute requires 
that the invention be novel and described with sufficient particularity to allow others to 
make and use the invention); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) 
(discussing requirements for patentability); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 135 (1997) (Patent law provides a market-
driven incentive to invest in innovation by allowing the investor to appropriate the full 
economic rewards of her invention.); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors 
to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ([T]he limited grant is a means by which an 
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to 
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.); 
William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 
1687 (1988) ([T]he elaborate combination of grants and reservations that comprise the 
Copyright Act is designed to advance the public welfare by rewarding creative intellectual 
effort sufficiently to encourage talented people to engage in it, while at the same time 
making the fruits of their genius accessible to as many people as possible as quickly and as 
cheaply as possible.). 
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necessary.272 
The second approach, whether it adopts the Kodak II presumption 
or Kaplows proposal, is not without its faults.  The presumption 
approach has been criticized for failing to calculate the incentives 
necessary to encourage innovation.273  While the Kaplow ratio test 
may resolve this issue, it proves difficult to apply in practice.274  The 
balance between gains and losses required under Kaplows ratio test 
could force courts and administrative agencies to perform an 
inappropriate function for which they may lack expertise and 
appropriate information.275  Courts and antitrust authorities may 
miscalculate the efficiencies of granting or not granting compulsory 
access.276  Neither the case law nor independent economic analysis 
has articulated workable quantitative criteria to correctly calibrate the 
incentives to induce an optimal amount of innovation.277 
The issues posed by the tension between innovation incentives and 
optimal deterrence can be grappled with in two ways.  The Kodak II 
courts focus on intent278 serves as one alternative.  As explained in 
Section 4(D)(2)(a) below, the Ninth Circuit held that Kodaks 
business justifications for its refusal to license its replacement parts 
to independent service organizations was pretextual.279  The court 
based its conclusion on the testimony of Kodaks parts manager who 
declared that patents did not cross his mind when Kodak instituted 
a policy of refusing to sell parts to independent repairers.280  The 
Kodak II courts subjective test has the advantage of avoiding the 
delicate task of economic balancing when deciding whether 
intellectual property drives the refusal to license the replacement 
 
 272 Patterson, supra note 254, at 1139. 
 273 Id. at 1140. 
 274 Id. at 1139. 
 275 See Kaplow, supra note 256, at 1833. 
 276 See id. 
 277 Marino Lao, Unilateral Refusal to Sell or License Intellectual Property & Antitrust 
Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J. L. PUB. POLY. 193, 214-15 (1999); GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra 
note 191, at 676; Patterson, supra note 254, at 1139. 
 278 Kodak II., 125 F.3d at 1219-20. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. at 1218-20. 
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parts.281  Unfortunately, the courts inquiry into the subjective 
motivation of IP holders undermines the advantage gained by 
foregoing economic balancing.  As explained section 4(D)(2)(a) 
below, the IP holders subjective motivation is always difficult to 
determine.282 
Professor Patterson of Fordham University School of Law has 
recently proposed an interesting and thoughtful theory to circumvent 
the difficult economic balancing which the second approach requires.  
Pattersons proposal is based on the idea that patents and copyrights 
protect inventions and expression, not products.283  Thus, intellectual 
property law should only provide special protection when the owner 
of the rights truly denies access to its intellectual property.284  This 
occurs only when the one who will use the IP is deprived of its 
use.285  According to Patterson, an independent service provider who 
seeks access to the owners protected parts in order to install them in 
the equipment of others cannot be deemed willing to use the 
owners IP.286  Therefore, an owners refusal cannot be justified on 
the grounds that the invention embodied in its products has patent 
protection.287 
This use-oriented approach, like the Kodak II approach, avoids the 
economic balancing between the fair return to the IP holder and the 
social loss that awarding an IP monopoly presents.288  Professor 
Pattersons theory has two advantages over the Kodak II approach.  
First, by focusing on actual business practice, rather than intent 
it avoids the uncertainty that the Kodak II courts reasoning 
introduces by relying on the IP owners subjective intent.289  Second, 
 
 281 Patterson, supra note 254, at 1139-41. 
 282 Id. at 1141. 
 283 Id. at 1134. 
 284 Id. at 1135. 
 285 Id.  Notice though, that as Professor Patterson acknowledges, the problem is that it is 
not always possible to make use of the underlying ideas in a copyrighted work without also 
copying the works protected expression.  Id.  Professor Patterson indicates that U.S. courts 
have tried to solve this problem by applying the fair use doctrine.  Id. at 1154. 
 286 Id. at 1136. 
 287 Patterson, supra note 254, at 1135. 
 288 Id. at 1141. 
 289 Id. 
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by focusing on the party to whom access is denied, instead of the 
owner of the intellectual property, the proposal better ensures that the 
return on IP relates to its value.290 
The drawback of Pattersons approach concerns the difficulty in 
determining the potential licensees true intentions: does the potential 
licensee desire to use the patent or the product wherein the patent 
is embedded?  Moreover, the success of such an approach remains 
unknown.  Unlike the other approaches discussed above, U.S. courts 
have yet to adopt it.  The validity of this approach lies in an 
expansive interpretation of the Patent Act.  Section 271 of the Patent 
Act291 grants the patent holder the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States.292  As Patterson points out, a service organization that buys 
and installs a part that incorporates a patented invention does not 
make the invention.293  Likewise, the service organization would 
not use the invention if the invention does not play a role in the 
products installation.294 
Questions remain as to the extent to which the service organization 
actually uses the invention when it resides in the part.  The reward of 
the owner probably depends not on the sales of the invention (in this 
case a market for the invention as such existed), but on the sales of 
the replacement part.295  Finally, one cannot argue that the service 
organization does not sell the invention.  Patterson tries to 
overcome this difficulty by arguing the following: if what the 
organization offers for sale is its service, in which parts are included, 
but does not sell the manufacturers parts independently of that 
service, it seems that a reasonable argument can be made that it 
does not sell the parts.296  The success of this interpretation remains 
uncertain. 
 
 
 290 Id. 
 291 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 292 Id. 
 293 Patterson, supra note 254, at 1149-50. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 1150. 
 296 Id. at 1149. 
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How Pattersons theory solves the issue of the proper incentives 
needed to maintain an optimal level of innovation remains 
unanswered.  The success of this approach hinges on a presumption 
that the incentive provided by intellectual property laws to innovate, 
represented by the right to exclude others from the invention 
(without then including within the scope of the IP the right to 
exclude others from making or selling the product in which the 
invention is embodied), is sufficient to stimulate the creation and 
dissemination of ideas.  Yet, precisely because the amount of 
incentive needed for optimal creativity remains unknown, one can 
reasonably argue that the right of IP holders to refuse to license 
products in which their inventions are embodied should be limited 
only to exceptional circumstances.  Any legal rule, either based on 
the essential facilities doctrine or the leveraging theory, that may 
decrease the value of IPRs by limiting or qualifying an IP owners 
right to the exclusive use of its own property, risks drastically 
reducing the incentive to innovate.297 
The ECJ seems to follow an approach similar to that of Professor 
Patterson.298  In Volvo AB v. Erik Veng, the ECJ held that Volvos 
refusal to license to an independent repairer its design rights for the 
front wing of its Series 200 automobiles did not amount to an 
abuse of dominant position under Article 82 of the EC Treaty.299  
However, the ECJ did hold that Volvo could not arbitrarily refuse to 
supply its wing panels to independent repairers.300  The ECJs 
holding relies on the idea that an arbitrary refusal to sell replacement 
parts cannot be justified by a concern for protecting Volvos IPR on 
its wing panels.301  In other words, the independent repairers in 
Volvo, like the independent service providers in Kodak II and Xerox, 
did not want to use Volvos design rights, but only offered a repair 
service for which the wing panels were required.302 
 
 297 Ronald W.  Davis, The FTCs Intel Case: What Are the Limitations on Throwing 
Your Weight Around? Using Intellectual Property Rights?, 13 ANTITRUST 47, 47 (1999). 
 298 Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. I-6211. 
 299 Id. at 6236. 
 300 Id. at 6235. 
 301 See id. at 6235, ¶ 8-9. 
 302 See id. at 6235, ¶ 9, 6224, ¶ 6-11. 
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The second approach, despite rejecting the pro-immunity 
approach, endorses the widely-held view that antitrust authorities and 
courts should take a more cautious approach in refusal-to-deal 
situations involving IPRs than other goods or services.303  Unlike 
conventional goods or services, IPRs form a legitimate basis for 
exclusivity because IPRs bear an inherent right to exclude others.304  
IPRs raise special concerns because limiting their exercise based on 
antitrust remedies may have the opposite effect of the desired goal of 
opening up markets.  Consequently, access to IPRs owned by a 
dominant firm, under this second view, should be granted on much 
narrower grounds than the granting of access to mere goods, 
infrastructures or services. 
B. Inroads on the Traditional Approach 
Under EU and U.S. law, the general rule is that an intellectual 
property owner with a dominant position is under no obligation to 
license its IPRs.305  Otherwise, the owner would be deprived of the 
substance of its rights if it were obliged to grant a license every time 
a person requested one and offered to pay a reasonable royalty.306  
Nonetheless, in recent years, significant inroads to this general rule 
have emerged that have generated legal uncertainty for dominant IP 
owners who refuse to license their IPRs.307 
 
 303 See Pitofsky, supra note 260. 
 304 See Case 238/87, Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6235. 
 305 E.g., Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 6211; Case T-
69/89, RTE v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-114; Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP 
v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743.  In the U.S., refer to the U.S. IP Guidelines, supra note 
5, at ¶ 2.2. 
 306 Case 238/87, Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6235, ¶ 8. 
 307 See Kobak, supra note 69, at 534; see also J.T. Westermeier, Interoperability, 
Standards, Intellectual Property and Antitrust, 566 PLI/PAT 235, 240 (1999); Charles L. 
Freed, Antitrust and the Duty to License Intellectual Property - Can Manufacturers Be 
Compelled to Deal with ISOs?, 14 ANTITRUST 33, 37 (1999). 
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C. The Application in the European Union of the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine to Refusals to License 
1. The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice Prior to 
Magill 
Before Magill,308, the landmark decision in this field was Volvo.309  
Volvo held a U.K. registered design for the front wing panels of 
Volvo Series 200 cars.310  Without Volvos authorization, Veng 
imported imitations of Volvos wing panels into the U.K. from other 
Member States.311  Volvo sought to prevent Veng from importing 
and marketing them in the U.K.312 
Volvo refused to license its design rights, despite Vengs 
willingness to pay a reasonable royalty.313  A British Court requested 
a preliminary ruling from the ECJ that would guide its decision 
whether this refusal amounted to an infringement of Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty.314 
Following the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, the ECJ 
reasoned that the right of the proprietor of a protected design to 
prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing 
without the proprietors consent products incorporating the design, 
constitutes the very subject-matter of its exclusive right.315  
Accordingly, the ECJ ruled that an obligation imposed on the 
proprietor of a protected design to grant to third parties, even in 
return for a reasonable royalty, a license for the production and 
marketing of products incorporating the design, would deprive the 
proprietor of the substance of his exclusive right.316  For this reason, 
 
 308 Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 
E.C.R. I-743. 
 309 Case 238/87, Volvo, 1998 E.C.R. 6211. 
 310 Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6213-14, 6233 ¶ 3. 
 311 Id. at 6234. 
 312 Id. at 6233. 
 313 Id. at 6234. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. at 6235. 
 316 Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6235. 
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a refusal to grant such a license cannot in itself constitute an abuse of 
dominant position.317 
In its holding, the ECJ introduced various nuances distinguishing 
the refusal to license the design rights from an arbitrary refusal to 
supply replacement parts.318  According to the ECJ, the exercise of 
an exclusive right by the proprietor of a registered design with 
respect to car body panels may be prohibited by Article 82 if it 
involves on the part of a dominant firm, any of three types of certain 
abusive conduct:. (i) the arbitrary refusal to supply replacement 
parts to independent repairers; (ii) the fixing of prices for 
replacement parts at an unfair level, or (iii) a decision to cease 
production of replacement parts for a particular model when many 
cars of that model are still circulating.319  The Volvo case is 
significant since the ECJ accepted that it is possible, under Article 
82, to interfere with rights falling within the specific subject matter 
of an IPR.  The ECJ further elaborated on the Volvo doctrine in 
Magill.320 
2.  The Impact of Magill on Refusals to License Intellectual 
Property Rights 
After Volvo, legal uncertainty surrounded the question of whether 
the owner of an exclusive right in a dominant market position should 
be required to license its IPRs to third parties when the owner, apart 
from refusing to grant the license, has committed no acts that would 
demand antitrust scrutiny.321  In Volvo, the ECJ identified three 
 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Case T-69/89, RTE v. Commission., 1991 E.C.R. II-485 (1991); Case T-70/89, BBC 
v. Commission. 1991 E.C.R. II-535 (1991); Case T-76/89, ITP Ltd. v. Commission., 1991 
E.C.R. II-575 (1991); Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP v. Commission., 1995 
E.C.R. I-743 (1995). 
 321 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-764.  A comment by 
Professor Korah regarding paragraph 9 of Volvo reflects the vagueness of the judgment: It 
seems then that the proprietor of an exclusive right, who is held to enjoy a dominant 
position, may be required either to license third parties, or to supply them with the protected 
product on terms which are not unfair, whatever that may mean. (emphasis added).  
KORAH, supra note 42, at 257; see also Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill, The 
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circumstances in which a  firms refusal to license its IPRs to a third 
party may constitute an abuse of dominant position.322  The ECJ, 
however, failed to indicate whether a refusal to license in other 
circumstances could also constitute an abuse of dominant position.323  
In Magill, the ECJ held that under certain exceptional 
circumstances, simply by refusing to license its IPRs to a third 
party, a dominant firm could violate Article 82.324  This theoretical 
legal exposure could compel dominant firms to always grant license 
requests.325  Dominant firms find Magill troubling because it fails to 
define what exceptional circumstances would warrant the granting 
of access to IPRs.326  Magill provides paltry guidance in this 
respect.327 
In Magill, three television stations (RTE, ITV and BBC) 
broadcasting in Ireland and Northern Ireland (U.K.) refused to 
license their copyright on the information contained in their 
respective program listings to the Irish publisher Magill TV Guide 
Ltd. (Magill).328  Magill briefly attempted to publish a 
comprehensive weekly television guide that competed with the 
broadcasters guides.329  The three broadcasters relied on their 
copyrights and obtained injunctions in the Irish courts to restrain 
Magill from publishing the guide.330  In 1986, Magill lodged a 
complaint with the Commission against the three broadcasters 
refusal to license their copyrights.331 
In 1988, the Commission condemned the three broadcasters for 
abusing their dominant positions by preventing the publication and 
sale of a comprehensive weekly TV guide in Ireland and Northern 
 
Judgment of the ECJ, 17 E.I.P.R. 297, 301 (1995). 
 322 Vinje supra note 321, at 301. 
 323 Id. at 323. 
 324 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-744-45, ¶ 3. 
 325 See Vinje, supra note 321, at 301. 
 326 Id. 
 327 See id. 
 328 Case T-69/89, RTE v. Commission., 1991 E.C.R. II-485, 494, ¶¶ 7-10 (1991). 
 329 Id. 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. at II-495, ¶ 11. 
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Ireland.332  The three broadcasters were forced to grant Magill a 
copyright license.333  The broadcasters appealed the decision, but the 
CFI upheld it.334  RTE and ITV subsequently appealed the judgment 
of the CFI before the ECJ.335  The ECJ affirmed the CFIs holding, 
but declined to endorse its reasoning.336 
The CFI based its ruling on the distinction between the existence 
and the exercise of an intellectual property right.337  The CFI 
developed this distinction by balancing the principle of free 
movement of goods within the common market against the 
protection of IPRs.338  The CFI transposed aspects of this 
jurisprudence to Article 82 cases.339  The CFI found that even though 
a refusal to license is not in itself an abuse, this lack of liability 
vanishes when the right is exercised to pursue an aim manifestly 
contrary to the objectives of Article 82.340  The CFI found that the 
broadcaster, RTE, prevented the production and marketing of a new 
product - a comprehensive weekly TV guide - for which there was 
consumer demand.341  The CFI opined that RTE acted to ensure its 
monopoly in the market of weekly TV guides.342  In so doing, the 
CFI held that RTE went beyond the scope of its copyright, because it 
 
 332 Id. at II-491, ¶ 1. 
 333 Id.; Commission. Decision 89/205/EEC, art. 1-2, 1989 O.J. (L 78) 43. 
 334 Case T-69/89, RTE, 1991 E.C.R. at II-496, ¶ 13. 
 335 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP v. Commission., 1995 E.C.R. I-743 
(1995). 
 336 Id. at 825, ¶ 58. 
 337 Case T-69/89, RTE, 1991 E.C.R. at II-510, ¶ 46. 
 338 Id. at II-518, ¶ 67, II-522-23, ¶¶ 76-77. 
 339 Rosa Greaves, Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission. of the European 
Communities, 4 EUR. COMP. L.R.  244, 247 (1995). See also KORAH, supra note 42, at 217-
18.  In criticizing the distinction between the existence of rights and their exercise 
Korah states: 
In legal theory, it is impossible to draw the line between the existence and the 
exercise, except at the extremes.  Analytically, the existence of a right consists 
of all the ways in which it may be exercised.  In ruling that an important 
difference rests on a distinction which cannot be drawn by logical analysis, the 
Court created a very flexible instrument for it to develop the law and reduce the 
value of intellectual property. 
Id. 
 340 Case T-69/89, RTE, 1991 E.C.R. at II-519, ¶ 71. 
 341 Id. at II-507-08, ¶¶ 41-42. 
 342 Id. at II-510, ¶ 46. 
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had pursued an aim manifestly contrary to the objectives of Article 
86 [now Article 82].343 
The problem with this approach is that a strict application of the 
existence/exercise doctrine to refusal to license cases could lead to a 
solution incompatible with the fundamental nature of IPRs.344  
Article 30 of the EC Treaty allows an organization with an IPR to 
derogate from the provisions on free movement of goods to protect 
industrial and commercial property, provided such derogation does 
not constitute arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
community trade.345  Since the very aim of an IPR is to give the 
owner the option of restricting competition,346 it would be difficult to 
determine when a refusal to license does not constitute a disguised 
restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 30 of the 
EC Treaty.347 
Perhaps, because the ECJ was aware of the shortcomings of the 
existence/exercise doctrine when applied to refusals to license IPRs, 
it instead followed a different line of reasoning.348  The ECJ 
confirmed that mere ownership of an intellectual property right does 
not confer dominant position.349  Yet since each of the broadcasters 
enjoyed a monopoly over the information contained in its program 
listings, each also held a dominant position over that information.350  
With regard to actual abuse, the ECJ rejected the appellants 
argument that a company is immune from antitrust laws when it 
exercises its copyright.351  In Magill, unlike in Volvo, the ECJ did not 
rely on the distinction between the existence and the exercise of 
IPRs.352  Instead, the ECJ focused on whether there were 
 
 343 Id. at II-520-21, ¶ 73. 
 344 See Vinje, supra note 321, at 300-01. 
 345 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP v. Commission., 1995 E.C.R. I-743, I-
816,  ¶ 25 (1995). 
 346 Id. at I-767, ¶ 67. 
 347 Marleen Van Kerckhove, Magill: A Refusal to License or a Refusal to Supply, 416 
PLI/PAT 997, 1003 (1995). 
 348 Vinje, supra note 307, at 297. 
 349 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-822, ¶ 46. 
 350 Id. at ¶ 47. 
 351 Id. at ¶ 48. 
 352 Vinje, supra note 321, at 300-01. 
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exceptional circumstances rendering the broadcasters refusal to 
supply the copyrighted information a violation of Article 82.353 
Contrary to the Opinion of the Advocate General,354 the ECJ found 
exceptional circumstances, and ruled that the broadcasters had 
abused their dominant position by relying on their copyrights in 
refusing to supply Magill with the basic information regarding their 
program listings.355  The ECJ pointed to three exceptional 
circumstances.356  First, there was no actual or potential substitute for 
a weekly television guide offering information on the weeks 
upcoming programs, despite a specific, constant and regular 
consumer demand.357  The broadcasters refusal to provide basic 
information (i.e., channel, day, time and title of the programs), the 
indispensable raw material358 for compiling a weekly guide, 
prevented the emergence of a new product which would have 
competed with the broadcasters own guides.359  Second, no business 
justification existed for the refusal, although the ECJ did not 
thoroughly discuss this finding.360  Third, the broadcasters had 
reserved for themselves a monopoly in the secondary market of 
weekly television guides by excluding all competition.361 
The ECJs judgment led to considerable disappointment for two 
reasons.362  First, the ECJ confronted the CFIs application of the 
existence/exercise doctrine developed under Articles 28 and 30 of 
the EC Treaty (free movement of goods) to Article 82 cases dealing 
 
 353 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-823, ¶ 46. 
 354 Id. at I-747. 
 355 Id. at I-824, ¶ 54. 
 356 Id. at I-824, ¶¶ 52-57. 
 357 Id. at I-823-24, ¶ 52. 
 358 GOYDER, supra note 67, at 357 (describing how the ECJ was concerned specifically 
with the refusal to supply information more than with a refusal to license).  Compare 
RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-824 with Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico 
Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223 
(concerning a reference to an indispensable raw material reminiscent of the wording used by 
the ECJ in traditional refusal to deal cases like Commercial Solvents). 
 359 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-824, ¶ 53-54. 
 360 Contra at I-767 (endorsing appellants argument that the right to refuse licenses must 
be regarded as necessary in order to guarantee the copyright owner the reward for his 
creative effort). 
 361 Id. at I-824, ¶ 50. 
 362 GOYDER, supra note 67, at 357; Greaves, supra note 339, at 246. 
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with refusals to license.363  Second, the ECJ failed to enunciate a 
clear legal doctrine for refusals to license IPRs.364  The Magill 
decision fails to address the question of when a product is considered 
sufficiently new to trigger the application of the judgment.365  
Perhaps the ECJs failure to establish a clear doctrine for refusals to 
license reflects an unwillingness to confine itself doctrinally, as 
happened in the wake of Volvo.366  Nonetheless, the ECJ should have 
addressed these issues to establish legal certainty.367 
The business world viewed Magill as a radical judgment.368  The 
case sparked anxiety among proprietors of IPRs, especially in the 
pharmaceutical and computer/software industries.369  Firms feared 
that a broad interpretation of Magill could devalue their rights.370  
The pharmaceutical industry feared that a firm holding an important 
patent could be forced to license its patent to other companies 
seeking to manufacture the product around the world,371 or to a 
holder of a major improvement.372  In this latter scenario, the patent 
holder would be deprived of its right to make available a new, 
improved product, severely undermining the prospective profit of the 
basic patent.373 
In the software industry, the Magill judgment ignited the debate 
surrounding the final adoption of the EC Software Directive.374  The 
EC Software Directive struck a balance between copyright protection 
and competition in the information technology industry.375  However, 
some commentators saw Magill as buttressing the pro-competition 
 
 363 See Greaves, supra note 339, at 247. 
 364 GOYDER, supra note 67, at 357. 
 365 H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It 
Work in Practice?, 6 E.B.L.R. 231, 233 (1995). 
 366 See Vinje, supra note 321, at 301. 
 367 Kerckhove, supra note 347, at 1003; see also Vinje, supra note 321, at 301; see 
generally GOYDER, supra note 67, at 357. 
 368 Vinje, supra note 321, at 302; contra Greaves, supra note 339, at 247. 
 369 GOYDER, supra note 67, at 359. 
 370 Id. 
 371 Id. 
 372 KORAH, supra note 42, at 258. 
 373 Id. 
 374 Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42. 
 375 Vinje, supra note 321, at 302. 
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agenda in the software industry.376 Software producers feared that the 
owner of a valuable software program could be prevented from 
effectively exploiting the program by being forced into widespread 
licensing.377  Following Magill, the varying scholarly views about 
the decisions future impact on licensing practices show the software 
producers fears were valid.378  The ECJs narrow interpretation of 
Magill, however, allayed these initial fears.379 
 
 376 Id. 
 377 GOYDER, supra note 67, at 359; Vinje, supra note 321, at 302-03. 
 378 Compare Vinje, supra note 321, at 302 (stating Magill is unlikely to be limited 
strictly to its facts, and it will be necessary for both rightholders and their competitors to 
review a whole range of conducts involving intellectual property from a new perspective.) 
with Greaves, supra note 339, at 246-47 ([t]he formulation of the judgment is so tied up 
with stressing the exceptional circumstances of this case that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to imagine another situation where the refusal to license by a copyright owner 
will be held an abuse of dominant position.) and Lugard, supra note 365, at 232 ([t]he 
conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to arrive at the conclusion that Article 86 [now 
Article 82] requires a company to license its intellectual property rights are multiple and 
quite strict, making the Magill doctrine difficult to apply in practice.); see also Forrester, 
supra note 47, at § 35-12. 
 379 See GOYDER, supra note 67, at 359; KORAH, supra note 42, at 259.  The Commission 
refused to apply the Magill doctrine in a complaint brought by a pay-per-view digital 
platform (Via Digital) against the grant by the right holder (Audiovisual Sport) of an 
exclusive license over football broadcasting rights to a competing TV digital platform 
(Canal Satelite Digital).  The licensee and the complainant were the only two digital 
platforms in Spain.  Before the exclusive license was granted, both platforms were entitled 
to broadcast Spanish league football games covered by the challenged license.  In 1999, the 
Commission granted a three year exemption to the exclusivity under Article 81(3) of the EC 
Treaty, and refused to consider football broadcasting rights as an essential facility, despite 
the claims from the complainant that football broadcasting rights were indispensable for the 
digital platform to continue operating in the market (the Commissions decision granting the 
exemption was never published).  Thereafter, however, the shareholders of each digital 
platform reached an agreement to share among themselves the football broadcasting rights 
of the Spanish league.  Pursuant to this deal, the parties granted exclusive football 
broadcasting rights to Via Digital and Canal Satelite Digital thereby excluding other pay-TV 
platforms from having access to the broadcasting rights.  The deal was notified to the EC 
Commission, which sent the parties a statement of objections lifting the immunity from 
fines normally stemming from the filing of a notification with the EC Commission.  The EC 
Commission threatened the parties with fines if they did not grant access to those rights to 
other pay-TV platforms on the ground that successful access to the Spanish pay-TV market 
relied heavily on the right to broadcast the relevant football games.  In June 2000, the parties 
granted access to the relevant football rights to new cable and digital terrestrial television 
entrants in Spain.  See IP/00/1352, Brussels, 23 November 2000.  The outcome of this case 
may indicate that in future cases the EC Commission will be more receptive to claims 
against granting exclusive broadcasting rights based on the essential facility doctrine.  See 
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Despite the judgments shortcomings, Magill was rightly decided 
on the merits.  Moreover, the ECJ ruling in Magill is important for 
two reasons.  First, it reflects the tension between intellectual 
property and EC competition laws.380  Second, Magill goes a step 
further than Volvo in its antitrust/intellectual property analysis.381  It 
was the first, and remains the only, case in which the ECJ imposed 
the duty to license an IPR to prevent the infringement of EC 
competition laws.382  The Magill holding is significant in that 
copyright compulsory licenses under EU competition law lack 
binding force in the individual member states.383  One may speculate 
that the ECJ opted not to express the true basis for its Magill decision 
out of concern that it would conflict with the national copyright laws 
of the different member states.384 
ECJ judges view Irish and U.K. copyright legislation with 
disfavor.385  While copyright laws are designed to encourage, protect, 
and reward creative innovation, copyrighted television listings hold 
little literary merit.386  That Magill concerns the publication of 
television listings explains why the holding should not extend to non-
copyright IPRs.387  Enforcing compulsory licensing for television 
listings does not significantly impact the production and release of 
program listings.388  The incentive to produce and disseminate 
programs will be the same irrespective of whether the broadcasters 
are protected from competition in the television guide market.389 
 
A.M. Wachtmeister, Broadcasting of Sports Events and Competition Law, 2 Competition 
Policy Newsletter, June 1998. 
 380 See Vinje, supra note 321, at 297. 
 381 Id. at 300. 
 382 Id. at 298. 
 383 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP v. Commission., 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 748 
(1995). 
 384 Id. at I-823 (indicating in paragraph 49 of the judgment that, in the absence of 
harmonization, the scope of intellectual property rights is a matter for national law). 
 385 See Korah, supra note 23, at 173; see also Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co 
KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, 
[1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 133-34 (1999). 
 386 See Greaves, supra note 339, at 246. 
 387 Ridyard, supra note 91, at 446. 
 388 Id. 
 389 Id. 
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Unlike television listings, however, the compulsory licensing of 
economically useful intellectual property discourages firms from 
committing resources to innovation.390  For this reason, other 
commentators welcomed the ECJs use of the circumstance-based 
approach.391  This novel approach marked the demise of the 
existence/exercise doctrine as a guide to determining whether a 
refusal to license runs contrary to Article 82.392  The judgment of the 
CFI in Ladbroke v. Commission393 confirms this hypothesis. 
Professor Korah reports that officials of the Commissions legal 
service pointed out, in their personal capacities, that Magill should be 
limited to unmeritorious kinds of intellectual property.394  
Ladbroke confirmed this view.395  In Ladbroke, the Commission and 
the CFI refused to apply Magill to a situation where the undertakings 
(PMI/PMU) holding the exclusive rights to televised pictures and 
audio commentaries on French horse races, and an undertaking 
holding the exclusive rights to market such performing rights in 
Austria and Germany (DSV), refused to license the right to 
retransmit such audiovisuals of French horse races to a Belgian 
betting agency (Tiercé Ladbroke).396  The CFI distinguished Magill 
from Ladbroke on three different grounds.  First, Tiercé Ladbroke 
enjoyed a dominant position in the Belgian horse races betting 
services market, and did not need a license to introduce a new 
product.397  Second, the license was not indispensable because 
sounds and images, although helpful, are not essential to a betting 
agency.398  Third, films are not indispensable since they are shown 
after the bets have been placed.399 
 
 390 Korah, supra note 23, at 173; Ridyard, supra note 91, at 446. 
 391 Darren Fitzgerald, Tiercé Ladbroke AS v. The Commission, 20 E.I.P.R. 154, 160 
(1998); see also Vinje, supra note 321, at 301. 
 392 Vinje, supra note 321, at 301. 
 393 Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-927 (1997). 
 394 VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENT AND THE EC COMPETITION 
RULES 53-54 (1996). 
 395 Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-923. 
 396 Id. 
 397 Id. at II-969, ¶ 130. 
 398 Id. at II-969, ¶ 132. 
 399 Id.; see generally Korah, supra note 23, at 169 (providing a thorough and critical 
analysis of this case). 
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The first of these three grounds evinces the CFIs narrow 
interpretation of Magills  novelty test.400  Rather than concluding 
that sounds and images of French horse races were a service 
ancillary to the betting market and not indispensable, the CFI could 
have found that the act of relaying these sounds and images in 
Belgium was itself a new product whose emergence was prevented 
by the refusal to license.401  Likewise, the weakness of the third 
ground could be interpreted as exemplifying the CFIs unwillingness 
to apply Magill to this case.402  In this respect, a logical 
counterargument could be that bettors, knowing the images were 
going to be shown after and not during the race, might still be 
strongly influenced in their choice of betting agency.403  Finally, 
along with the opinions of Commission officials and the outcome of 
Ladbroke, the ECJs judgment in Oscar Bronner, narrowly 
interpreting Magill and the essential facilities doctrine, also weighs 
against a broad interpretation of Magill.404 
The foregoing indicates that the ECJs holding in Magill is so 
constrained by the specific facts and exceptional circumstances of 
the case, that the judgment is unlikely to be successfully transposed 
to other situations.405  Magill is thus not likely to be repeated.406  
Some may argue that the Magill judgment is not radical.407  In fact, 
the decision does not seem to have had much impact on the conduct 
of copyright owners, and has not taken the evolution of EC 
competition much further than Volvo,408 much less added legal 
certainty in this field. 
Despite the narrow interpretation given by the Commission and the 
CFI to Magill, the paucity of reasoning by the ECJ in Magill and the 
 
 400 Fitzgerald, supra note 391, at 160. 
 401 Id. 
 402 Id. at 160-61. 
 403 Id. at 161. 
 404 E.g., Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 133-34 
(1999). 
 405 Contra Vinje, supra note 321, at 302. 
 406 See Greaves, supra note 339, at 247. 
 407 Id. 
 408 Id. 
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CFIs failure in Ladbroke to expressly limit Magill to extreme cases 
leave some unanswered questions.409  First, it is still unclear whether 
the holder of an important patent, which is indispensable to a third 
party seeking to introduce a new product that will compete with the 
right holders product, may refuse to license its patent without 
infringing Article 82.  The reasoning of the ECJ in Magill does not 
give much guidance in this respect.  Yet, the narrow interpretation 
given by the Commission and the CFI make it unlikely that a patent 
holder or a copyright owner, in circumstances markedly different 
from those in Magill, would be forced to grant a license under EC 
competition law.410 
Second, neither Magill nor Ladbroke shed any light on what would 
happen if, in a Magill-type scenario, the defendant tried to prevent 
antitrust liability by providing the new product itself.411  It seems this 
should be enough to avoid the application of Article 82 to the refusal 
to license, especially if the defendant can prove it had planned to 
enter that market before the plaintiff requested the license.412  
However, if the introduction of the product is seen as a stark reaction 
to the request for the license, then the possibility cannot be ignored 
that the Commission might perceive such conduct as a pretext to 
exclude a new product from the market, and as such, contrary to 
Article 82. 
 
 409 Korah, supra note 23, at 176. 
 410 See Lugard, supra note 365, at 234. 
 411 See id. at 233. 
 412 See id. 
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D. The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Refusals  
to License Intellectual Property in the United States 
1. Overview 
a. The United States Supreme Court Case Law 
For many years, U.S. courts almost uniformly held that the owner 
of a valid IPR that has not engaged in any form of misuse, such as 
the tying of unpatented articles, price fixing over an unpatented 
product, or the bringing of unjustified infringement claims does not 
violate antitrust laws and, therefore, cannot be compelled by Section 
2 of the Sherman Act to license its rights to a competitor.413  In 
Miller Insituform v. Insituform of North America, 414 the Sixth 
Circuit was asked to decide whether a licensor that had terminated an 
exclusive sublicense agreement, allegedly to retake as exclusive the 
territory granted to the sublicensee, could be held liable under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.415  The court distinguished a simple 
refusal to license from other improper practices that may run afoul of 
the Sherman Act, such as tying or illegal price fixing activities in 
connection to patents.416  The court found that none of the improper 
practices leading to liability under the Sherman Act were present in 
the case at hand and accordingly confirmed the grant of summary 
judgment for the defendant.417  The court held that a patent holder 
who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act simply by refusing to license the patent to 
others.418 
 
 
 413 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 188; Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 
197, at 537; Freed, supra note 307, at 33. 
 414 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 415 Id. at 607. 
 416 Id. at 608. 
 417 Id. at 609. 
 418 Id. 
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Similarly, in Advanced Computer Services of Michigan v. MAI 
Systems,419 a district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
copyright holder MAI Systems (MAI), a minicomputers 
manufacturer.420  Several independent service providers (ISP) sued 
MAI for an alleged violation of Section 1 (tying its software to its 
services) and Section 2 (monopolization of MAI computers service 
market) of the Sherman Act.421  MAI had requested that the 
independent service providers cease copying its computer software 
used for the maintenance of MAI computers.422  The district court 
held that MAI could not be held liable for monopolization because 
the enforcement of its copyrights do not constitute copyright 
misuse, nor does it constitute anticompetitive conduct in violation of 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.423 
With the exception of Kodak I,424 none of the Supreme Courts 
duty-to-deal precedents involved intellectual property.425 After 
Kodak I, the rule articulated in Miller Insituform, Advance Computer 
Services, and other cases426 involving refusal to license patents or 
copyrights came under scrutiny and was revised.427  In Kodak I, 
Kodak changed its long established pattern of distribution and 
refused to supply replacement parts for its copiers to independent 
service providers.428  Some ISPs sued Kodak for attempting to 
monopolize the service market by leveraging its dominant position in 
the replacement parts market.429  Kodak filed a motion for summary 
judgment that was eventually rejected by the Supreme Court.430 
 
 
 419 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
 420 Id. at 371. 
 421 Id. at 359. 
 422 Id. at 359-60. 
 423 Id. at 370. 
 424 Eastman Kodak Co.  v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (Kodak I). 
 425 Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 533. 
 426 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 427 Freed, supra note 307, at 33. 
 428 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 458. 
 429 Id. at 459. 
 430 Id. at 479. 
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In its opinion, the Court did not thoroughly address the issue of the 
interconnection between intellectual property laws and antitrust laws.  
Its most relevant statement in this regard is contained in a succinct 
footnote.431  In footnote 29 of its opinion, the Supreme Court 
introduced some confusion as to whether a patent owner may be 
compelled under antitrust laws to license its technology.432  The 
Court noted that power gained through some natural advantage or 
legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can 
give rise to liability, if a seller exploits its dominant position in one 
market to expand his empire into the next.433  Although it is unclear 
whether the Court endorsed the theory that an IP owner could be 
required to license its rights to avoid antitrust liability,434 the Kodak I 
decision decisively influenced the rulings by lower courts in the Data 
General435 and Kodak II436 cases. 
b. The Relevance of the Protection of Innovation Markets 
for the Development of the Essential Facilities Doctrine: 
the Microsoft and Intel Cases 
i.  The Implementation of the Intellectual Property 
Guidelines 
The IP Guidelines state that U.S. agencies will protect competition 
in innovation markets.437  According to the IP Guidelines research 
and development directed at particular new or improved goods or 
processes characterizes an innovation market.438  This concept is 
 
 431 Id. at 479,n. 29. 
 432 See id. 
 433 Id. 
 434 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1215-16 (declining however to specifically address the question 
of antitrust liability based upon a unilateral refusal to deal in a patented or copyrighted 
product). 
 435 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 436 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1215-16. 
 437 See IP Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 3.2.3. 
 438 See id.  A commentator has defined innovation as a process which concerns the 
R&D to create products which do not exist for markets that may be only dimly conceived.  
This is a search for competitive markets before there are sales, before there are even patents 
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important because if U.S. courts and antitrust authorities consider the 
process of competitive innovation in a particular field as a separate 
good that requires protection, plaintiffs may then go a step further, 
and demand that a competitor grant a license on the grounds that its 
IPRs constitute an essential facility.  U.S. agencies have already 
relied on this innovation concept in at least two landmark antitrust 
cases.  Indeed, the protection of innovation markets underlies the 
approach taken by the Department of Justice in United States v. 
Microsoft439 and by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the In 
re Intel case.440 
ii.  The Microsoft Case and the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine 
Since the facts in the Microsoft case are generally well-known, 
they will not be addressed in detail here.441  It is germane, however, 
that in Microsoft the innovation concerns related to the preservation 
of development of future Windows alternatives.442  Nevertheless, the 
district courts Findings of Fact have been criticized for not having 
specified sufficiently how the alleged anticompetitive conduct of 
Microsoft is supposed to have affected, or might affect the 
innovation efforts of potential competitors in the computer operating 
systems market.443 According to Judge Jackson, [t]here is 
 
or trade secrets.  Kobak, supra note 6, at 361.  Protecting innovation markets requires 
authorities to prosecute actions which may harm the ability and incentives of existing and 
potential rivals in R&D for the future. Valentine supra note 5, at 9. 
 439 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of 
Fact); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of 
Law). 
 440 In re Intel Corp., No.  9288, Agreement Containing Consent Order, (FTC March 17, 
1999) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelagreement.htm (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2001).  Intergraph, an Intel customer, also brought a civil lawsuit under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act against Intel in a District Court.  The FTCs findings are broader than the 
civil Intel case since the opinion analyzed the behavior of Intel towards Intergraph, Digital, 
and Compaq.  Moreover, the FTC, unlike the District Court, took into account the 
innovation market concept in its evaluation of the anti-competitive conduct.  See id. 
 441 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact). 
 442 Id. at 27; James B. Kobak, Jr., Microsoft: Questions of Harm and Remedy, Vol. 14, 4 
CLA BULLETIN, 118, 120 (2000). 
 443 See id. 
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insufficient evidence to find that, absent Microsofts actions, 
Navigator and Java already would have ignited genuine competition 
in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems.444  Despite 
this finding, the court held that Microsoft retarded, and perhaps 
altogether extinguished, the process by which these two middleware 
technologies could have facilitated the introduction of competition 
into an important market.445  The court also found that Microsoft 
sacrificed revenues by giving away Internet Explorer in order to 
achieve this objective.446  Regrettably, as Professor Kobak has 
pointed out,447 the court did not make any specific finding that 
Microsoft would recoup its losses, as the Supreme Court requires in a 
pure predatory pricing case.448 
On April 3, 2000, Judge Jackson issued his Conclusions of Law.449  
The court held that Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
by unlawfully maintaining its monopoly power in the Intel-
compatible PC operating systems market, and by attempting to 
monopolize the Web browser market by anticompetitive means.450  
The court also found that Microsoft violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act by unlawfully tying its Web browser to its operating 
system.451 
According to the Conclusions of Law, the exclusionary conducts 
of Microsoft were aimed at eliminating interoperability of 
middleware software applications - Navigator and Java -  to preserve 
the high entry barriers in the market for Intel-compatible PC 
operating systems.452  By maintaining high entry barriers, Microsoft 
sought to prevent potential software developers from attempting to 
develop an operating system to compete with Windows.453 
 
 444 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 112 (Findings of Fact). 
 445 See supra note 442 (emphasis added). 
 446 Id. at 46. 
 447 See Kobak, supra note 442, at 120. 
 448 See Brooke Group, Ltd.  v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 
(1993). 
 449 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (Conclusions of Law). 
 450 Id. 
 451 Id. 
 452 Id. at 38-39. 
 453 Id. 
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While a thorough analysis of the Microsoft case goes beyond the 
scope of this essay, the issue regarding the kind of remedies that 
would be equitable in the Microsoft case provoked a hot debate that 
is worth mentioning.454  A wide range of remedies is available to a 
court depending on their effects upon the defendants business.  The 
court can choose between conduct and structural remedies, or 
combine elements of each, depending on its liability findings and its 
goals for relief.455 
The remedy must be proportional to the need to recreate the 
market situation that would have existed absent the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct.456  In some cases it will be enough to order 
a simple injunction to prevent the repetition of any illegal practices.  
In others, a court may go further and prohibit discrimination or ban 
tying and exclusive arrangements.  Only when conduct remedies may 
be ineffective to restore the competitive conditions of the market 
should the court consider structural relief (dissolution of the 
defendant or divestiture of assets).457 
Courts also must take into account the characteristics of the 
industry in which the relief will produce its effects.458  Particularly in 
markets involving high-technology industries, courts have imperfect 
information available and their mistakes are likely to be enduring and 
costly.459  Over-deterrence may interfere with the markets self-
 
 454 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64-70 (D.D.C. 2000).  The issue 
of the proper remedies in the Microsoft case has been subject to conflicting commentaries.  
Compare John E.  Lopatka & William H.  Page, A (Cautionary) Note on Remedies in the 
Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 25, 28 (1999) (arguing against the adoption of structural 
remedies; i.e.; the breaking-up of Microsoft) with R. Craig Romaine & Steven C.  Salop, 
Slap Their Wrist? Tie their Hands? Slice Them Into Pieces? Alternative Remedies for 
Monopolization in the Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 15, 17-18 (1999) (arguing that, due to 
the network effects of the Windows operating system, the structural remedy is the only 
efficient remedy to restore competition in the market). 
 455 Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 17-19. 
 456 Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27-28. 
 457 Id. at 26. 
 458 Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 15. 
 459 Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 25-26; Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, 
Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 617 (1999) (stating that Microsoft may determine the course of computer software 
industry for the next ten or twenty years). 
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correcting forces,460  especially in high-technology markets where 
rewards drive innovation.461  If those rewards are taken away, 
innovation will likely decline, and in the long run consumers will 
suffer.462 
In Microsoft, the court ultimately chose a combination of structural 
and conduct remedies.463  On June 7, 2000, the court issued its final 
judgment, adopting the DOJs proposed remedies and ordering 
Microsoft to divide, into two firms, one selling Windows and the 
other selling business applications such as Word or Internet 
Explorer.464  The goal of this remedy was to lower barriers to entry 
into the operating systems market by eliminating the incentive for 
Microsoft to leverage its operating system monopoly power into the 
business applications market.465  The costs of this remedy on 
Microsofts business, and the difficult decision facing Microsoft 
officers in terms of selecting the line of business to be retained, may 
be better evaluated by taking into account that Microsoft earns about 
45% of its revenue from Windows and more than 40% from its 
business applications.466 
The court also imposed upon Microsoft several conduct remedies 
to be implemented over a period of three years if the breakup order 
withstands appeal, and ten years if it does not.467  The restrictions are 
 
 460 Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 25-26. 
 461 Id. at 27.  Salop and Romaine have argued that liability standards should not be more 
permissive in high-technology industries.  Salop & Romaine, supra note 459, at 664.  These 
economists state that when: 
[A] market is driven more by innovation than price competition, then entrants 
also must have an open environment to challenge the monopoly.  An overly 
permissive antitrust regime may reduce aggregate innovation, as innovation by 
entrants by potential new entrants and small competitors is reduced by more 
than innovation by the monopolist increases. 
Id.  This approach, however, appears to overlook that over-deterrence in a particular case 
may have a spillover effect in the whole industry so that potential entrants or competitors 
also may be discouraged from committing resources to innovation. 
 462 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 463 Id. 
 464 Id. 
 465 See id. 
 466 Microsoft Split Ordered by Judge Jackson, 13 SOFTWARE LAW BULLETIN, July 2000, 
at 111. 
 467 See Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 66. 
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aimed at neutralizing the primary potential drawback of ordering the 
divestiture of Microsoft along functional lines.468  Microsoft could 
circumvent the divestiture order by achieving a de facto integration 
with favored partners, mainly through the discriminatory disclosure 
of Windows application programming interfaces (APIs)469 or other 
technical information regarding the interoperability of applications 
with Windows, and also through the use of tying clauses and 
exclusive dealing clauses.470  To prevent this circumvention, the final 
judgment imposes upon Microsoft: (i) the obligation to disclose, in a 
timely and non-discriminatory manner, technical information about 
its products to internet service vendors, independent hardware 
vendors, and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs ); (ii) a 
prohibition on modifying its operating system to interfere with or 
degrade the performance of non-Microsoft programs; (iii) a ban on 
exclusive dealing and tying arrangements that condition the granting 
of Windows on an OEM or other licensee agreeing to obtain any 
other Microsoft product; and (iv) a ban on tying middleware 
products, such as Internet Explorer or Microsofts version of Java, to 
the purchase of Windows.471 
It must be pointed out that neither the DOJ nor the district court 
relied on the essential facilities doctrine to seek a Section 2 
infringement declaration.472  However, the court could have 
concluded, in deciding which remedy was the most appropriate, that 
Windows was an essential facility.  This could have happened, for 
instance, if Judge Jackson had accepted the argument that imposing a 
structural remedy was not in societys interests because of the high 
 
 468 See id. 
 469 See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 24, n. 18.  APIs are the instructions 
required by application developers to write an application (such as Netscape or Java) that 
will run on a particular operating system or interoperate with another particular application.  
Id.  The Windows APIs are controlled by Microsoft and contain the information developers 
need to write software that runs on the Windows operating system.  Id. 
 470 See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 21. 
 471 See Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 65-69. 
 472 See generally Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 59.  (finding a § 2 Sherman Act violation 
by focusing on: (1) whether a relevant market existed; (2) whether Microsoft possessed 
actual power to exclude competition from the relevant market, and; (3) whether Microsoft 
used anticompetitive methods to achieve or maintain its position without pro-competitive 
business motives). 
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fragmentation cost this measure might entail.473  In order to qualify 
as an essential facility, Windows must be considered indispensable 
for applications developers to remain in the market.474  Under the test 
laid out by the court in MCI, this means that other actual or potential 
competitors cannot and could not practically or reasonably duplicate 
Windows. 475 
The Microsoft court found that competitors cannot feasibly 
duplicate Windows.476 However, in the computer industry, a sector 
characterized by a high tendency towards innovation as well as the 
presence of strong financial and technical players, one could question 
whether it is practical or economically feasible to develop viable 
alternatives to Windows within a reasonable period of time.477 
In view of the market reality of computer industry, it is arguable 
that neither the investment nor the time required to develop a new 
operating system would be insurmountable for potential entrants in 
the operating systems market.  Even if the court had doubts about the 
likely availability of Windows alternatives, the structure of the 
computer market itself should have established a strong presumption 
that viable alternatives were possible.  Further, the existence of other 
operating systems such as Unix, Linux and Netware confirms that it 
is feasible to develop operating systems as alternatives to 
 
 473 See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 20. 
 474 See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, Inc., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); see 
also discussion infra Section III.C.2. 
 475 See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1133. 
 476 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, ¶¶ 18-29 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact).  
According to the court: 
Currently there are no products, nor are there likely to be any in the near future, 
that a significant percentage of consumers worldwide could substitute for Intel-
compatible PC operating systems without incurring substantial costs.  
Furthermore, no firm that does not currently market Intel-compatible PC 
operating systems could start doing so in a way that would, within a reasonably 
short period of time, present a significant percentage of consumers with a 
viable alternative to existing Intel-compatible PC operating systems  (emphasis 
added). 
Id.  The Microsoft court, however, does not specify how short the period to establish a 
viable alternative to Windows must be to avoid antitrust liability.  See Hawker, supra note 
226, at 137-38. 
 477 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27-28. 
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Windows.478 
If the creation of an alternative to Windows were technically and 
economically feasible, then the main condition under the MCI test 
for qualification as an essential facility would not be met.479  The 
MCI court found that it was not feasible to duplicate a local 
telephone network, in part because it was uneconomical, largely 
because MCI could not obtain regulatory clearance to duplicate local 
networks.480 
If Windows were considered an essential facility, several 
alternative or cumulative remedies could be imposed on 
Microsoft.481  The most feasible remedy would probably have been 
to order Microsoft to license its Windows source code to other 
companies.482  Like the remedy actually ordered, this remedy would 
have led to the breaking-up of the company.  However, unlike the 
business line breaking-up solution ultimately selected, which 
leaves the Windows business intact, Microsoft would have been 
divided into several independent firms selling competing versions of 
Windows. 
The question that arises is whether the breaking-up of Microsoft, 
in any of its variations, may be disproportionate in view of the 
infringements found by the court.  If we assume that the objective of 
equitable relief is to restore the competitive structure and consumer 
welfare that would have developed absent Microsofts 
anticompetitive conduct,483 then it is reasonable to argue that the 
breaking-up of the company goes beyond what is necessary to restore 
 
 478 However, the functioning and maintenance of Linux, Unix and Netware require a 
more developed computer technical assistance than Windows, although the difference 
between Linux and Windows on this point is narrowing. 
 479 See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1081. 
 480 See id. at 1133. 
 481 See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 15. 
 482 See id. at 21-22 (distinguishing between two possible licensing remedies: 
compulsory licenses and a one-time licensing auction.  The latter would not require the 
sharing of newly developed IP over a long period of time because of the one-time nature of 
the entitlement).  See also Steve Lohr, On Breaking up Microsoft Into Baby Bills, N.Y 
TIMES, Mar. 5 1999, at C2. 
 483 See Salop & Romaine, supra note 459, at 667. 
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this status quo ante.484 
Some commentators have pointed out that the usual conditions 
requisite for structural relief are not present in Microsoft.485  
Microsoft did not achieve its monopoly by illegal acquisitions or as a 
result of government regulations, but simply by offering a product 
that consumers preferred.486  That Microsoft acquired its monopoly 
lawfully does not necessarily mean, however, that a structural 
remedy could not be appropriate in some situations.487  For instance, 
if Microsoft had faced competition, and destroyed its most likely 
potential competitor by means of exclusionary practices, then it 
could have been persuasively argued that a structural remedy was 
necessary to kick-start the market.488  It is unclear, however, both 
in the Findings of Fact and in the Conclusions of Law, to what extent 
Microsofts conduct impeded the introduction of a viable alternative 
to Windows.489 
The court appears to acknowledge that Microsoft did not prevent 
the entrance of other competitors into the market, since the court was 
not able to identify any specific potential entrant.490  Imposing on 
Microsoft the creation of rivals, based on the general presumption 
that Microsoft would have stifled innovation in the operating systems 
market, may be overreaching.  The breaking-up of Microsoft will 
introduce a level of competition greater than that which market 
forces would likely have introduced, but for Microsofts conduct.  In 
other words, this measure may lead to the creation of 
governmentally sanctioned free riders, undermining the incentives 
to innovate.491 
 
 
 484 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27. 
 485 See id.; see also Kobak, supra note 442, at 121. 
 486 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27. 
 487 See id. 
 488 See Salop & Romaine, supra note 459, at 18. 
 489 See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(Findings of Fact); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(Conclusions of Law). 
 490 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (Findings of Fact); Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 30 
(Conclusions of Law) . 
 491 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27. 
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The alleged network effects of Windows have also provided 
ammunition to those defending structural relief as necessary.492  
Commentators have argued that, since Windows exhibits network 
effects, conduct remedies might be insufficient to kick-start the 
market.493  The idea underlying this argument is that markets for 
goods exhibiting strong network effects tend to involve high barriers 
to entry, mainly because in these kinds of markets the value of the 
goods depends directly on the number of consumers.494  Thus, once a 
monopoly is achieved it is difficult for new entrants or competitors to 
replace the incumbent, even if they offer a superior product.495 
This approach ignores the difficulty of applying the network 
theory to justify structural remedies in Microsoft.496  First, it 
overlooks the fact that high-technology industries are not inclined to 
have network effects.497  In those markets, especially in the software 
industry, it is difficult to argue that an incumbent, even one whose 
market power is protected through exclusionary acts, will retain its 
advantage when faced with competition from a superior product.498 
Second, even if the operating systems market exhibits network 
effects, structural remedies might be appropriate to correct a situation 
provided that a company used illegal exclusionary practices to tip the 
market to its product, thereby locking in consumers to a possibly 
inferior standard.499  In this situation, conduct remedies would be 
insufficient to recreate the market that would have existed had the 
exclusionary conduct not occurred.500  It has not been proven, 
however, that Microsoft locked its customers into a product 
technologically inferior to the product that could have existed but for 
 
 492 See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 18. 
 493 See Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 
674 (1999). 
 494 See id. 
 495 See id. 
 496 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27-28. 
 497 Id. 
 498 Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 28 (stating that there is no empirical evidence 
that network markets in fact lock in on inferior standards.  To the contrary, empirical studies 
of software markets indicate that superior products regularly displace inferior ones) . 
 499 Id. at 27. 
 500 See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 18-20. 
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Microsofts exclusionary practices.501 
The DOJ accused Microsoft of using illegal exclusionary practices 
to maintain high application barriers in the market for computer 
operating systems, thereby entrenching its monopoly.502  The court 
held that Microsoft, in order to achieve a monopoly, sought to 
exclude Netscape and Java from their respective markets, thereby 
preventing the evolution of both applications into a competing 
platform.503  These findings would only justify the imposition of a 
structural remedy upon Microsoft if it had been proven that the 
browser and Java markets actually tipped to the Microsoft 
standard.504  In light of this reasoning, the structural remedy imposed 
upon Microsoft may be overreaching.505  It would have been enough 
to impose upon Microsoft a conduct remedy, such as the 
disallowance of exclusionary practices or the ban of tying and 
exclusive dealing arrangements, to thwart Microsofts alleged 
entrenching plans.506 
iii.  The Intel Case: The Federal Trade Commission 
Complaint and Consent Order 
The FTC/Intel case507 was initiated by an FTC complaint charging 
Intel with a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act for having refused 
to continue to provide trade secret information on its new products to 
three of its customers (Intergraph, Digital Equipment and 
Compaq).508  The FTC alleged Intels conduct was a means of 
coercing licenses to its customers rival microprocessor 
technology.509  The FTCs legal argument was a classic Section 2 
 
 501 Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27. 
 502 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of 
Fact). 
 503 Id. at 30-34, 105. 
 504 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27. 
 505 See id. 
 506 See id. at 28; Cotter, supra note 9, at 13. 
 507 See In re Intel Corp., No. 9288, Complaint, 1, 3-4, ¶ 11-14, 42 (FTC June 8, 1998), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 508 See id. 
 509 The commitments undertaken by Intel in the consent decree are in stark contrast with 
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argument, alleging that Intel had willfully maintained its monopoly 
power in the microprocessors market through exclusionary 
conduct.510 
The FTC, finally settling through a consent decree, concluded that 
a natural and probable effect of Intels conduct was to diminish the 
incentives to Intergraph, Digital Equipment (Digital) and Compaq, 
as well as other firms that were Intel customers or otherwise 
commercially dependent upon Intel, to develop innovations relating 
to microprocessor technology.511  This vague language reflects that 
the FTC asserted its theory in almost doctrinaire fashion, offering no 
proof of actual competitive harm or tangible diminution of research 
effort.512 
This criticism may apply only to the FTCs position vis-à-vis the 
conduct of Intel regarding Intergraph, not Digital.  While the former 
was not a competitor of Intel, the latter was competing with Intel in 
the microprocessors market with its Alpha microprocessor.513  Thus, 
as far as Digital was concerned, the FTCs fears that innovation 
would be hindered and stifled by Intels behavior may have been 
justified.514  However, this distinction does not necessarily justify the 
FTCs position.  The antitrust analysis required to sustain a 
compulsory license is  meager both in the FTC Complaint and in the 
subsequent Consent Decree.  Regardless of whether Digital was an 
actual or potential competitor of Intel, the FTCs position needed a 
 
the holding of the Federal Circuit in Intels appeal of the district courts opinion.  See 
generally Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (1999 Fed. Cir.).  The district court 
granted a preliminary injunction requiring Intel to continue providing Intergraph access to 
technical information about its new products.  Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1999 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 9681 (D. N. Ala. 1999).  The Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff had not 
proved that Intel had monopolized or attempted to monopolize any market by refusing to 
give Intergraph trade secret information regarding improvements in its microprocessors.  
Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1363-64. 
 510 See Valentine, supra note 5, at 8-9. 
 511 See In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, at 4, ¶14. 
 512 See James B.  Kobak, Jr., Microsoft Decision Article, (working paper, on file with 
author); see also Orson Swindle, What Are We Learning from the Microsoft Case?, Speech 
delivered before the Federalist Society (September 30, 1990), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/swindle/federalist990930.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 513 See In re Intel Corp., No.  9288, Complaint, at 4, ¶17. 
 514 See id. at 4-5, ¶15-21. 
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more detailed analysis.  First, the FTC should have closely examined 
whether Intel had a monopoly in the microprocessors market, and 
second, whether, through the alleged anticompetitive conduct 
described in the Complaint, Intel entrenched its alleged monopoly. 
That Intel might not have monopoly power in the microprocessors 
market, despite its approximately 80% market share, is not merely a 
hypothesis.  In an industry with such a high level of innovation, 
comprised of financially and technically robust players, high market 
share can be eroded quickly by existing or potential competitors.  
Therefore, U.S. agencies should have been more circumspect in 
finding a monopoly in the microprocessors market.515 
Even if we accept that Intel had monopoly power, whether this 
case was about preservation of monopoly power is far from clear.516 
Intergraph abandoned the microprocessor business when it began 
using Intel chips.517  As commentators have pointed out, there is no 
evidence to suggest that Intergraph was in a position to produce 
competing chips in the foreseeable future, or even that it was 
planning to do so.518  With regard to Digital, it seems that the Alpha 
microprocessor was already competing, albeit it unsuccessfully, with 
the Intel Pentium microprocessor.519  These facts cast doubt on 
whether Intels behavior was aimed at entrenching a monopoly, or 
rather at defending itself against patent infringements, as the circuit 
court suggests in the judgment issued in the civil litigation 
proceedings.520 
The FTC supported its monopolization claim by arguing that 
Intels behavior was unnecessary and served no pro-competitive 
 
 515 The position taken by FTC Commissioner, Orson Swindle, supports this argument, 
expressing uncertainty as to whether Intel, despite its extremely large market share in 
general purpose microprocessors, actually had monopoly because it appeared to face 
aggressive competition from innovative firms, especially those that were supplying general 
purpose microprocessors for personal computers costing less than $ 1,000. See Orson 
Swindle, supra note 512. 
 516 See Randal C.  Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POLY 159, 177 (1999). 
 517 Id. at 190; Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1350 (1999 Fed. Cir.). 
 518 Picker, supra note 516, at 177-78. 
 519 Id. at 178. 
 520 See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1357-58. 
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purpose.521  The question remains, however, whether a firms 
defensive measures should serve a pro-competitive purpose.  Intel 
may have had a legitimate business justification for no longer 
treating those three customers as preferred when faced with 
expensive patent litigation.522  Under this view, the FTC may have 
turned what was really no more than a patent dispute between a 
supplier and its customers into an antitrust case. 
Phrased differently, Intels conduct may not be seen by the FTC as 
pro-competitive, but why should it be?  Intels conduct was 
contractually justified because its supply agreements with its 
customers provided for termination without cause.523  It was also 
commercially justified because a firm in this position, even one 
enjoying market power, would normally try to accommodate its 
customer relationships.524 
The broad language used both in FTC/Intel and Microsoft 
underlines the main problem in defining innovation markets.  If what 
antitrust laws are trying to protect is the process of innovation, and 
this process may take place before a product has even been created 
and put into the market, then U.S. agencies and courts will often 
have scant empirical evidence about innovation markets, since 
companies prefer not to disclose much information on their 
innovations.525  Moreover, the anticompetitive impact of an 
agreement or a refusal to license on R&D is difficult to establish 
because a negative effect can often only be determined after such 
work has been completed.526 
The lack of empirical evidence may create legal uncertainty in 
U.S. courts and agencies findings, as well as significant failures in 
 
 521 In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 5, ¶20 (FTC June 8, 1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 522 See W. Greg Papciak, Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 
337-38 (1999). 
 523 Id. at 340. 
 524 Id. 
 525 See Laurence B. Landman, Innovation and Structure of Competition: Future Markets 
in European and American Law, 81 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 838, 878 (1999). 
 526 Id.  at 860-64 (explaining why legal and regulatory structures in which agencies 
operate will not allow them to find innovation markets). 
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their decisions.527  Given the financial and material resources which 
R&D often entails, a mistaken decision in this field may discourage 
future investments in this field, ironically stifling competition instead 
of opening up future markets. 
Commentators have argued that the FTC and DOJ policy regarding 
the protection of innovation in the computer industry is based on a 
faulty hypothesis, namely, that U.S. agencies believe that protection 
of innovation promotes competition, which leads to lower prices and 
faster innovation.528  However, one should wonder to what extent 
cases such as Intel are necessary in an industry that has witnessed 
price declines and product improvements as fast as any other 
industry.529  Likewise, one should wonder about the efficiency of the 
remedies imposed by U.S. agencies or courts on todays 
extraordinarily dynamic markets.530 
2. Refusals to License: Is Antitrust Law Encroaching Upon 
Intellectual Property Laws Domain? 
a.  The Tide is Rising for Intellectual Property Rights: Data 
General, Kodak II and the Federal Trade Commission 
Consent Decree in Intel. 
The tension among the different approaches toward the interplay 
between antitrust liability and intellectual property rights referred to 
in Section IV.A above is reflected in conflicting judgments regarding 
refusals to license.  Although the First Circuit in Data General531 and 
the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II532 did not rely on the essential facilities 
doctrine, the holding in both cases provides support for its 
 
 527 See Kobak, supra note 6, at 359. 
 528 See Robert J. Barro, Why the Antitrust Cops Should Lay Off High Tech, BUSINESS 
WEEK, Aug. 17, 1998, at 20. 
 529 See id. 
 530 See id. 
 531 Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 532 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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application to IPRs.533  In stark contrast, in In re: Independent 
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,534 the Tenth Circuit 
expressly refused to follow the Ninth Circuits holding in Kodak II.  
Instead, it held that, in the absence of proof that the monopolist 
acquired the protection of IPRs in an unlawful manner, a refusal to 
license is immune from antitrust laws.535 
In Data General, a computer manufacturer, Data General (DG), 
refused to license its copyright over a sophisticated computer 
program to an independent service provider (Grumman).536  The 
program is used to diagnose problems in DG computers.537  DG and 
Grumman were competitors in the market for service to DG 
computers.538  Grumman contended that by refusing to license its 
copyright, DG had illegally maintained its monopoly in the service 
market.539  DG argued that IPRs are immune from antitrust laws.540  
The court refused to heed DGs argument that a refusal to license can 
never constitute exclusionary conduct.541  The court concluded that a 
monopolists refusal to deal is not always entirely pro-competitive 
because consumers can be harmed by such refusal.542 
Accordingly, the court reasoned that some type of presumption 
may be appropriate to evaluate these situations.543  After reviewing 
precedent and relevant patent and copyright statutes, the court held 
that neither the Sherman Act544 nor the Copyright Act545 works a 
partial repeal of the other.546  Thus IPRs, although protected by 
 
 533 See James E.  Hartley, Monopolization: The Essential Facility Doctrine and the 
Market Shares for Monopolization and Attempt Cases, SC71 ALI-ABA 249, 254 (1998). 
 534 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 535 See id. at 1134. 
 536 See Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 
1994). 
 537 See id. at 1152. 
 538 See id. (Grumman, a third party maintainer, provided, repair and maintenance 
services which came to involve the servicing of Data Generals computers). 
 539 See id. 
 540 See id. 
 541 See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187. 
 542 See id. 
 543 See id. 
 544 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 545 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000). 
 546 See Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 
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intellectual property laws, are not explicitly exempt from the 
application of antitrust law.547  The court then reasoned that the most 
appropriate way to harmonize intellectual property laws and antitrust 
laws was to establish a presumption whereby, while exclusionary 
conduct can include a monopolists unilateral refusal to license a 
copyright, an authors desire to exclude others from using its 
copyrighted work is presumptively valid business justification for 
any immediate harm to consumers.548 
Thus, the court in Data General established a rebuttable 
presumption for unilateral refusals to license a copyright.549  
However, it did not delineate the situations in which that 
presumption can be overcome.550  The only specific reference to the 
possible grounds for such rebuttal is found in footnote 64 of the 
decision.551  There, the court indicated that the presumption may be 
rebutted when imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the 
objective of the Copyright Act.552 Although, this statement does not 
precisely identify those situations, the decision enables the 
identification of at least two situations where the presumption may 
be overcome.553 
First, the presumption may be rebutted in Aspen Skiing-type 
cases.554  Contrary to Grummans request, the court refused to apply 
Aspen Skiing to the facts of the case at bar arguing that the reasoning 
of Aspen Skiing does not hinge on the fact that the defendant in that 
case withdrew assistance upon which competitors may have relied 
when entering the market.555  According to the First Circuit, Aspen 
Skiing turns on a comparison of the behavior of firms in a 
competitive market with a monopolist behavior once competition has 
 
1994). 
 547 See id. 
 548 Id. 
 549 See id. 
 550 See id. 
 551 See id., n. 64. 
 552 See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188. 
 553 See id. 
 554 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1982). 
 555 See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1156. 
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been curtailed.556  Thus, the analytical framework of Aspen Skiing 
could not be transposed to the facts of Data General since the court 
was unable to view DGs market practices in both competitive and 
noncompetitive conditions.557  Unlike the defendant in Aspen Skiing, 
DG had always been a monopolist in the market for servicing its 
computers, despite the inroads made by third-party maintainers.558  
Second, by holding that Grumman did not prove that DG had 
acquired its software in an unlawful manner, the court implied that 
the presumption could also be overcome if the plaintiff shows the 
defendant has misused its IPRs.559 
In Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit adopted a modified version of the 
rebuttable presumption laid down by Data General.560  The court 
held that while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolists 
unilateral refusal to deal to sell a [patent or] copyright, or to sell its 
patented or copyrighted work, a monopolist desire to exclude others 
from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business 
justification for any immediate harm to consumers.561  The court 
reached this conclusion despite having found no reported case in 
which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to 
sell or license a patent or copyright.562 
The difference between the Kodak II and Data General 
presumptions is found in the circumstances in which the 
presumptions may be rebutted.563  The Ninth Circuit endorsed Data 
Generals approach, concluding that the presumption of legitimacy 
can be rebutted by evidence that the monopolist acquired the 
protection of intellectual property laws unlawfully.564  Significantly, 
however, the court added that the presumption may also be rebutted 
 
 556 See id.; see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 587. 
 557 See supra note 556. 
 558 Compare Data General, 36 F.3d at 1156, with Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 587 (Data 
General had provided an exclusive maintenance service to its computers, whereas Aspen 
Skiing Co. joined with its competitors to provide an all-Aspen pass for all resorts.). 
 559 See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188-89. 
 560 See id. at 1156; Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218. 
 561 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218. 
 562 See id. at 1216. 
 563 See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 564 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218. 
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by evidence of pretext.565  The court found that neither the aims of 
intellectual property law, nor of antitrust law, justify allowing a 
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justifications to mask 
anticompetitive conduct.566 
The procedural history of the case is helpful in understanding why 
the court eventually rejected Kodaks justification for its refusal to 
deal with ISOs.567  The Ninth Circuit confirmed a jurys finding that 
Kodak had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by refusing to 
supply patented and unpatented replacement parts for its copiers.568  
Kodak relied on the protection of its patents as a valid business 
justification for refusing to supply some of the replacement parts, 
only after the case was remanded from the Supreme Court to the 
Ninth Circuit.569  The court then rejected this argument as 
pretextual.570 
The court found evidence of pretext in the state of mind of 
Kodak employees.571  In particular, the court recalled that Kodaks 
parts manager testified that patents did not cross [his] mind at the 
time Kodak began to change its parts policy.572  The court also found 
that Kodak had not distinguished between patented or copyrighted 
parts and non-patented or non-copyrighted parts.573  Instead, Kodak 
issued a blanket refusal to sell any replacement parts to ISOs.574  In 
light of the pretextual reasons submitted by Kodak as justification for 
its refusal, the court took the unprecedented step of requiring 
complete compulsory licensing by a firm not found to have engaged 
in illegal tying, improper infringement suits, or any other patent 
 
 565 See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188. 
 566 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1219. 
 567 See id. at 1212 (discussing that exclusionary conduct does not violate § 2 of the 
Sherman Act if it is supported by a legitimate business justification). 
 568 See id. at 1219. 
 569 See id. at 1219-20. 
 570 See id. (rejecting Kodaks business justification argument on the basis of pretext, 
finding that it was not a genuine reason for Kodaks conduct). 
 571 See id. 
 572 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1210-20. 
 573 See id. at 1220. 
 574 See id. at 1219. 
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misuse.575 
The Kodak II decision has been widely criticized as inconsistent 
with the Patent Act as amended in 1988 as well as with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.576  Section 271(d) of the Patent Act states that: 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for 
infringement. . .of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent 
right by reason of. . .[the patent owners] (4) refus[sal] to 
license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) 
condition[ing] the license of any rights to the patent or 
the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a 
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a 
separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the 
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for 
the patent or patented product on which the license or 
sale is conditioned.577 
For these commentators, a refusal to license is clearly not an 
illegal extension of the patent right within the meaning of Section 
271(d)(4) of the Patent Act.578  They argued that by disregarding 
congressional intent, the Kodak II court made a mistake when it 
condemned a patentees simple refusal to sell its patented parts.579  
The courts reasoning that the Patent Act did no more than codify the 
existing law does not help to resolve the inconsistency of its ruling 
with the Patent Act.  As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp point 
out, the fact that a limiting statute merely codifies existing law hardly 
justifies the adoption of a rule significantly expanding existing law; 
existing law had never compelled licensing in the absence of misuse 
and in conflict with the statutes language.580 
 
 575 See id.; see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 190. 
 576 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000); see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 53, at 190-200; 
Burling Lee & Krug, supra note 197at 527; Kauffman, supra note 7 at 471; Hovenkamp, 
supra note 205. 
 577 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000). 
 578 See id.; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 198. 
 579 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 197-98. 
 580 See id. 
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These commentators have also argued that the introduction of an 
intent-based presumption in Kodak II is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Courts holding in Professional Real Estate v. Columbia 
Pictures Industries (PRE).581 In PRE, the Supreme Court held that 
the right of a copyright holder to pursue an infringement action 
cannot be made dependent on its anticompetitive state of mind.582  
The Kodak II rule creates this anomalous situation: under PRE a 
patentee who files an infringement action to exclude the alleged 
infringer from some market may have its infringement claim 
resolved on patent law merits without regard to its intent.583  By 
contrast, the patentee who merely refuses to license its patent is 
subject to antitrust scrutiny depending on whether its intent was 
anticompetitive.584  Although a copyright case, PRE is consistent 
with the Patent Act, which allows exclusionary activity without 
reference to the patent holders subjective motivations.585  Lower 
courts have consistently applied PRE to patent infringement actions 
as well.586 
Given this Supreme Court decision, it is difficult to understand 
why the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II ignored this precedent and failed 
to explain its reasons for deviating from it.587  Perhaps the Kodak II 
court did not refer to PRE because the Supreme Court in PRE 
applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to an infringement action.588  
 
 581 See id.; Profl Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
 582 See Profl Real Estate Investors, 8 U.S. at 57-58. 
 583 See generally id.; Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1195. 
 584 Profl Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57-58. 
 585 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 189-190. 
 586 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 192. 
 587 Id. 
 588 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine establishes the basic principle of antitrust immunity 
for petitioning conduct.  This doctrine is rooted in the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution which states that: Congress shall make no law [. . .] abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petitioning 
the Government for a redress of grievances.  U.S. CONST. amend. I, art. 1.  According to 
this doctrine, joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even 
though intended to eliminate competition.  See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381U.S. 657 
(1965).  The Noerr-Pennington doctrine originally applied to immunize efforts to influence 
legislative or administrative officials, but was extended by the Supreme Court to insulate 
from antitrust laws attempts to influence adjudicative bodies.  See California Motor 
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
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Thus, the court may have thought that since Kodak was not bringing 
an infringement action, but rather taking action to keep patented 
parts out of the hands of possible infringers, Kodaks behavior could 
not be analogized to an infringement action enough to justify an 
application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
A recent case supports the idea that the Kodak II decision is 
inconsistent with PRE.  In Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC,589 a 
district court held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies not 
only to infringement actions, but also to pre-litigation actions.590  
According to the court, which quoted Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp on this point, given that pre-litigation communications 
provide useful notice of potential liability and facilitate the 
settlement of controversies, it would be unwise to apply antitrust 
rules to them.591  The district court did not analogize pre-litigation 
communications to refusals to license.592  However, the reasoning in 
Primetime 24 supports an argument that an IP holder that refuses to 
license its IPRs cannot be held liable under antitrust laws depending 
on whether its subjective intent was anticompetitive. 
Even if the ruling in Kodak II were consistent with the Patent Act 
and Supreme Court precedent, there would be grounds to argue that 
it is inappropriate to rely on the state of mind of the defendant to 
determine whether the plaintiff has overcome the presumption that 
the defendants refusal to license IPRs was not anticompetitive.  In 
intellectual property cases, the anticompetitive behavior or intent 
coincides with the specific subject matter of IPRs, namely, giving the 
holder the power to exclude competition.593  By allowing the plaintiff 
to rely on the defendants subjective motivations to rebut the 
presumption, the court may have given plaintiffs the upper hand in 
rebutting the presumption.594  One can hardly imagine a situation 
where a patent holders sole purpose in refusing to deal with a 
 
 589 21 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D. N.Y. 1998). 
 590 Id. at 356-57. 
 591 Id. 
 592 See id. at 350. 
 593 See Patterson, supra note 254, at 1138-40. 
 594  See generally Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC, 21 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D. N.Y. 
1998). 
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competitor would be a desire to protect its IPRs.595  Such a desire is 
always driven by the goal of increasing profits by being the sole 
supplier of the protected good or service.596 
According to some authors, Kodak II stands as an example of how 
a careless application of antitrust laws597 may create concerns in 
licensing strategies.598  By finding that Kodak had unlawfully 
leveraged its monopoly power from the replacement parts market 
into the market for services, the court disregarded Kodaks two-
hundred and twenty patents on sixty-five of the necessary parts.599  
The courts reasoning and understanding of the relationship between 
a patent and the market it affects is unrealistic.  Leveraging does not 
exist when a patent holder merely exercises the rights inherent in its 
IPRs, because these IPRs give the holder the right to exclude 
competition in different markets.600  According to this school of 
thought, decisions like Kodak II may have adverse effects on IP 
holders.  By facilitating competitors access to IPRs through 
 
 595 Kauffman, supra note 7, at 523; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 193. 
 596 Kauffman, supra note 7, at 523. 
 597 It has been argued that the court finding of monopoly power was based on 
insufficient evidence.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was substantial evidence that 
Kodak possessed the requisite market share to constitute monopoly power on the basis of 
the following: (i) Kodaks own manufacturer of Kodak parts (30%); (ii) its control of 
OEMs sales of Kodak parts to ISOs through tooling clauses (20-25%); and (iii) its 
discouragement of other part-makers from selling Kodak parts to ISOs.  Notice that the 
court only identified a 55% market share by Kodak.  The court presumed the percentage of 
discouraged sales, despite the fact that the ISOs did not provide proof of any agreement or 
practice to discourage these sales.  Moreover, the court could not calculate the percentage of 
parts made by other part manufacturers affected by the alleged discouraging practices.  See 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 195; Kauffman, supra note 7, at 514-16. 
 598 Westermeier, supra note 307, at 242-43. 
 599 Id. at 241. 
 600 See Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 539.  Professor Hovenkamp has stated: 
Kodak reasoned that the patent entitled Kodak to protect its parts monopoly but 
not its service monopoly.  But this reasoning rests on a flawed 
misunderstanding of a patent.  A patent describes an invention not a market.  
Many patents, particularly for intermediate goods, might be used in final 
products or processes that operate in a wide variety of markets.  For example, a 
patent mixing process might be applied to paint, peanut butter, and prescription 
drugs.  A patented microprocessor circuit might be used in personal computers, 
navigation systems or bread machines. 
HERBER HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 330 (1999). 
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compulsory licensing, these types of decisions could discourage 
manufacturers R&D by casting uncertainty on whether they will 
realize the expected return on their investments.601 
In contrast, commentators have only criticized the reasoning of the 
Kodak II court but not the decision.602  According to Professor 
Patterson, the Kodak II court was correct in ordering Kodak to 
supply its patented parts to independent service providers.603  
Nonetheless, Patterson criticizes the Kodak II court for having 
focused on the subjective motivation of Kodak in holding that the 
presumption in favor of the legality of Kodaks commercial policy 
had been rebutted. 604  According to Patterson, the IP holders 
subjective motivation will always be difficult to determine.605 
Under Pattersons user-oriented approach, the outcome of the case 
would have been the same.606  Kodaks refusal to supply its patented 
parts to the independent service providers was not related to their use 
of its IPRs, but rather to the independent service providers use of 
parts where the IPRs were embodied to provide their services to the 
copiers owners.607  Under this approach, it would not be permissible 
for Kodak to refuse to supply its patented parts to ISPs.608 
b. The Tide is Turning for Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Xerox and Intel Cases 
Not all courts have accepted the Kodak II solution to reconcile the 
tension between antitrust law and intellectual property law.  In the 
Intel and Xerox cases,609 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
 
 601 Kauffman, supra note 7, at 526. 
 602 Patterson, supra note 254, at 1155-58. 
 603 Id. at 1135. 
 604 Id. at 1151-54. 
 605 Id. 
 606 See discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
 607 Notice that this distinguishes Kodak II from Data General, where the independent 
service providers needed to use DGs software to provide their service to owners of DG 
computers. 
 608 Id. at 12-15. 
 609 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Indep. 
Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. (CSU, L.L.C.  v. Xerox Corp.), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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adopted a more pro-intellectual property right approach. 
i. The Intel Case 
Intel illustrates the different approaches taken by U.S. agencies 
and courts regarding refusals- to-license IPRs.  This case involved a 
dispute between Intel, the worlds largest designer, manufacturer and 
supplier of high performance microprocessors used in desktop 
computers, laptops, servers and workstations, and Intergraph, a 
workstation manufacturer and one of Intels customers.610 
In 1993, Intergraph had abandoned its patented Clipper 
microprocessor and began incorporating Intel microprocessors into 
its workstations.611  The dispute arose when Intergraph asserted its 
Clipper patents against several of Intels original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM), based on their use of Intel 
microprocessors.612  When settlement negotiations failed, Intel 
refused to continue supplying Intergraph with samples of its 
computer chips and technical information about new products, 
ostensibly to coerce Intergraph to settle these patent claims by cross-
licensing to Intel the patented technology in dispute.613 
The district court upheld Intergraphs claim that the advanced 
chips, and the secret technical information comprising them, were 
essential facilities to allow Intergraph to compete effectively in the 
workstations market, and granted a preliminary injunction against 
Intel.614  Intel appealed the district courts order and the Federal 
Circuit reversed it.615  The Circuit Court held that the district court 
misapplied the essential facilities doctrine.616  Contrary to 
Intergraphs position, the court held that the presence of a 
competitive relationship in the market where the monopolistic 
behavior is alleged is prerequisite to applying the essential facilities 
 
 610 Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1349-50. 
 611 Id. at 1350. 
 612 Id. 
 613 Id. at 1350-51. 
 614 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9681, 4-5. 
 615 Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1367. 
 616 Id. 
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doctrine.617  The court reached this conclusion after warning that the 
essential facilities doctrine is not an invitation to demand access to 
the property or privileges of another, on pain of antitrust penalties 
and compulsion.618  On this point there is some similarity between 
the Intel judgment and the ECJs judgment in Oscar Bronner.619 
The court found that Intergraph and Intel did not coexist in any of 
the relevant markets, namely, the market for high-end 
microprocessors and the graphics subsystems market.620  The court 
refused to accept that Intergraph was present in the former by virtue 
of its Clipper patents.621  A patent right, the court reasoned, is a legal 
right to exclude, not a commercial product in a competitive 
market.622  Likewise, and reversing the district courts findings, the 
Federal Circuit held that, even if there were evidence that Intergraph 
was planning to enter into the graphics subsystems market, there was 
neither evidence nor even a suggestion of monopoly power by Intel 
in that market.623  The Federal Circuit ruled that neither under the 
essential facilities doctrine, nor under the leveraging monopoly 
theory, had Intergraph proved that Intel had monopolized or 
attempted to monopolize any of the markets where Intergraph was 
active.624  The reasoning of the court is premised on the assumption, 
as the court itself stated, that antitrust laws do not have the objective 
to protect competitors, but rather competition: [t]o constitute a 
violation, the monopolists activities must tend to cause harm to 
competition, unrelated harm to an individual competitor or consumer 
is not sufficient.625 
 
 
 617 Id. at 1357. 
 618 Id. 
 619 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 620 Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1355. 
 621 Id. 
 622 Id. 
 623 Id. 
 624 Id. at 1357-60. 
 625 Id. at 1355.  Notice that in the EU Advocate General Jacobs, in his Opinion in Oscar 
Bronner, relied on the same argument.  See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. 
Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 
4 C.M.L.R. 112, 130, at ¶ 58 (1999); see also discussion Section III.B. 
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The court also refused to accept the restrictive approach adopted 
by the district court in response to Intels argument that its 
proprietary information and pre-release products were subject to 
copyrights and patents.626  The district court had held that Intels 
intellectual property did not confer upon Intel the privilege or 
immunity to violate antitrust laws.627  Despite agreeing with the 
district court on this point, the Federal Circuit noted that the antitrust 
laws do not negate the patentees right to exclude others from patent 
property.628  The court refers to the rebuttable presumption 
established by the First Circuit in Data General and the Ninth Circuit 
in Kodak II, but does not expressly endorse it.629  It then relied on 
Section 271(d)(4) of the Patent Act and on some existing case law 
favorable to the right of a licensee to refuse to license its IPRs.630  It 
held that an IP holder who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held 
liable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for maintaining the market 
power he lawfully acquired by refusing to license the patent.631  On 
the basis of the precedents mentioned, and the language of Section 
271(d)(4) of the Patent Act, the court concluded that the owner of a 
proprietary information has no obligation to provide it, whether to a 
competitor, customer or supplier.632  The court added that a customer 
who is dependent on a manufacturers supply of a component cannot, 
on that ground, force the supplier to provide it absent an 
anticompetitive act.633 
The judgment of the court appears consistent with the essential 
facilities doctrine as developed by precedent.634  The courts 
acceptance of Intergraphs position would have been an unwarranted 
extension of precedent.  The outcome of the case appears to indicate 
that the Federal Circuit accepted that Intels behavior was motivated 
more by its patent and contractual dispute with Intergraph than by 
 
 626 Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1362-63. 
 627 Id. 
 628 Id. at 1362. 
 629 Id. at 1362-63. 
 630 Id. 
 631 Id. 
 632 Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1362-63. 
 633 Id. 
 634 Papciak, supra note 522, at 323; HOVENKAMP, supra note 600, at 200. 
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any intent to unlawfully maintain or acquire monopoly power in any 
of the relevant markets.635 
The judgment of the Federal Court in Intel contrasts in two ways 
with the approach taken by the FTC in its Complaint brought against 
Intel for infringement of Section 5 of the FTC Act.636  First, the FTC 
Complaint was brought on the basis of a fuller factual record, i.e., 
Digital was competing with Intel in the microprocessors market.637  
Second, unlike the Federal Circuit, the FTC focused on the impact of 
Intels refusal to license on the innovation markets for 
microprocessors.638 
As described in Section IV.D.1.b.iii above, the FTC found that 
Intel had cut off its supplies of chip samples and strategic 
information about its new products to at least three of its main 
customers (Compaq, Digital and Intergraph) in order to force these 
customers to grant Intel licenses related to microprocessor 
technology.639  Intel argued that its withholding of its IPRs from 
Compaq, Digital and Intergraph, in response to these firms 
withholding their IPRs from Intel, represented a legitimate response 
to the threat to microprocessor innovation caused by the existing 
patent minefield.640  According to Intel, the overabundance of 
microprocessor patents threatened to stifle innovation in the market 
since a microprocessor manufacturer might be subject to multiple 
demands by the holders of these patents.641  In Intels view, 
microprocessor manufacturers can only neutralize this risk by 
pursuing cross-licensing policies.642 
The FTC dismissed Intels business justification for its conduct 
and considered Intels behavior exclusionary.643  The FTC held that 
 
 635 Papciak, supra note 522, at 340. 
 636 In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, (FTC June 8, 1998), 4, ¶ 14, available at  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 637 Valentine, supra note 5, at 8; In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 4-5, ¶¶ 15-19. 
 638 Valentine, supra note 5, at 9; In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 3-4, ¶¶ 11-14. 
 639 Valentine, supra note 5, at 3, In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 3-4, ¶¶ 11-12. 
 640 Intel Corporation Trial Brief [Public Version], ¶¶ 41-42 (Feb.  25, 1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/intelbrief.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 641 Id. 
 642 Id. at 9, ¶¶ 41-42. 
 643 In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 3-4, ¶¶11-14. 
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the natural and probable effect of Intels conduct was to diminish 
the incentives of those three Intel customers  as well as other firms 
that are Intel customers or otherwise commercially dependent upon 
Intel to develop innovations relating to microprocessor 
technology.644  According to the FTC, Intels exclusionary conduct 
effectively undermines the patent rights of such firms and reduces 
their incentives to develop new technologies that might compete with 
Intel microprocessors.645  The FTC concluded that, by engaging in 
these coercive business tactics, Intel had willfully maintained its 
monopoly power in the microprocessor market and had also 
attempted to monopolize both current and future generations of 
microprocessors.646 
The FTC proceedings against Intel were resolved by Consent 
Decree.647  The Consent Decree required Intel to do precisely the 
opposite it would have been entitled to do under the judgment of the 
Federal Circuit vacating the injunction of the District Court.648  It 
was now required to supply these three customers, and other 
customers in the same situation, its confidential new product 
information.649 
The FTC/Intel case raises the issue of whether the function of U.S. 
agencies is to force a proprietor to license its IPRs on the grounds of 
the probable anticompetitive effects of its refusal on the relevant 
market.  The answer will depend on whether the protection of future 
innovation is conceived as a good deserving so much protection so 
 
 644 Id. at 4, ¶ 14. 
 645 Id. 
 646 Id. at 9, ¶¶ 41-42. 
 647 In re Intel Corp., No.  9288, Agreement Containing Consent Order (FTC March 17, 
1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelagreement.htm (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2001). 
 648 Id. 
 649 Id.  The Consent Decree requires Intel, for a period of ten years, to cease impeding 
access to its confidential product information for reasons related to situations where the 
customer has asserted or threatened to assert any IPRs.  Id.  It is interesting to note that 
under Professor Pattersons user approach theory, one can argue that Intels 
discriminatory practices were not related to its potential licensees use of Intels IP, but 
rather were based instead on whether those licensees had asserted their own IPRs against 
Intel.  Patterson, supra note 254, at 1159. The FTC Complaint and the Consent Decree are 
consistent with this approach.  Id. 
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as to justify setting aside the idea that an IP holder is entitled to any 
returns it can get on its IPRs.  The FTC in the Intel case and the DOJ 
and the district court in the Microsoft case seem to think so.  If the 
FTCs views are accepted, it must follow that, despite IPRs, there are 
situations in which a firm with monopoly or market power may be 
required to create its own competition, as the FTC Complaint and the 
district court decision in Intel suggest.650  This is also the approach 
that seems to have been adopted by the district court in Microsoft.651  
It is important to note that, when the court rejects Microsofts 
copyright defense to justify the restrictions on original equipment 
manufacturers selling Windows with Netscape and the tying of 
Internet Explorer to Windows, the court does not mention cases 
favoring IPRs immunity from antitrust liability, such as the Xerox 
case.652  Instead, it relies on those judgments that may be interpreted 
as denying such immunity, such as Kodak II and Data General.653 
The idea underlying the FTC Complaint is not necessarily wrong.  
Innovation markets may deserve antitrust protection.  However, as 
stated in section IV.D.1.b.iii above, antitrust complaints must be 
based on empirical evidence rather than on speculative and 
theoretical assumptions on the possible or probable effects of a 
refusal to license in the relevant innovation market.  The FTC 
Consent Decree and the decision of the district court in Intel may be 
seen as part of the same saga as Data General and Kodak II.  The 
FTC and the district court relied on the Ninth Circuit to find intent to 
monopolize on the part of Intel.654  As with the Ninth Circuit in 
Kodak II, it is unclear how their conclusions may be reconciled with 
Supreme Court precedent and the congressional intent of the Patent 
Act.655 
 
 650 David Balto, Protecting Competition from the abuse of Monopoly Power: The Intel 
Case, 16 No. 6/7 COMPUTER LAWYER 4, 9 (1999). 
 651 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 9, 40-41 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(Conclusions of Law). 
 652 Id.; In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322  (Fed. Cir. 2000).  In this 
case the Federal Circuit appears to endorse the idea that conduct based on IPRs is immune 
from antitrust laws. 
 653 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41 (Conclusions of Law). 
 654 Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 541. 
 655 Id. 
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ii. The Xerox Case: Data General and Xerox 
Distinguished 
The Ninth Circuits holding in Kodak II has been expressly 
rejected by other courts for its inconsistency with Supreme Court 
precedent and Section 271(d) of the Patent Act.656  On February 17, 
2000, the Federal Circuit rendered its decision affirming the district 
courts ruling for Xerox.657  In this case, Xerox refused to supply 
ISOs with replacement parts for its printers and copiers, but allowed 
the equipment owners themselves to purchase the replacement 
parts.658 An ISO brought suit alleging that Xerox had infringed 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.659  The Federal Circuit denied appeal 
of the district courts ruling in which the district court found that 
Xeroxs unilateral refusal to license or sell its patented parts could 
not constitute unlawful exclusionary conduct under antitrust laws.660  
After the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Kodak II, the plaintiff 
requested that the district court reconsider its decision in light of 
Kodak II.661 
The district court expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit 
and confirmed its previous decision.662  The district court argued that 
the Ninth Circuit overlooked the distinction between patent 
monopoly and economic monopoly, by assuming that a single 
patent can create at most a single inherent economic monopoly.663  
However, the scope of a patent monopoly is defined by the claims of 
a patent, not by the limits of what a court determines is the most 
analogous antitrust market, whereas the scope of an economic 
monopoly refers to a firms power to control the price of a product in 
 
 656 Hovenkamp, supra note 205, at 479. 
 657 In re Indep. Serv., 203 F.3d at 1329-30. 
 658 In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (D. Kan. 1997), 
affd, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 659 Id. 
 660 In re Indep. Serv., 203 F.3d at 1324. 
 661 In re Indep. Serv., 989 F. Supp. at 1134. 
 662 Id. at 1135-37. 
 663 Id. at 1135. 
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a properly defined relevant antitrust market.664  This means that a 
patent can implicate multiple antitrust markets within which the 
patent holder can rely on its claims to exclude third parties from 
those markets.665  The district court held that a patent holders intent 
in exercising its exclusionary power is irrelevant because the right to 
exclude competition is expressly authorized by law, provided that 
power is exerted within the limits of the patents claim.666  The 
district court also referred to the Supreme Court ruling in Kodak I.667  
There, the Supreme Court reasoned that power gained through some 
natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright or business 
acumen can give rise to antitrust liability if a seller exploits his 
dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next 
market.668  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the district court reasoned that 
the Supreme Court statement was not applicable where a patent 
holder, exercising its unilateral refusal to license or use its invention, 
acquires a monopoly in two separate antitrust markets.669  In Xerox, 
the court stated that there is no antitrust leveraging of monopoly 
power when a patent holder merely exercises its rights inherent in the 
patent grant.670 
 
 664 Id. 
 665 Id. 
 666 In re Indep. Serv., 989 F. Supp. at 1140-41 
 667 Id. at 1135. 
 668 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479, n. 29 (1992). 
 669 In re Indep. Serv., 989 F. Supp. at 1135. 
 670 Id. at 1135.  Professor Patterson has suggested that the Xerox court misapplied 
Section 271(d) of the Patent Act to the facts of the case.  According to Professor Patterson, 
contrary to what Xerox argued, Xeroxs behavior cannot be insulated from antitrust laws by 
virtue of Subsection (4) of Section 271(d) (no patent owner shall be deemed guilty of 
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of having refused to license its 
IPRs).  As the legislative history makes clear, that Subsection refers to a complete refusal to 
license rather than to selective licensing, the latter being the conduct which Xerox was 
pursuing.  If Subsection (4) is not applicable, then the question that arises is whether 
Xeroxs policy of conditioning access to its parts on not purchasing independent repairers 
services could be caught under Subsection (5) of Section 271(d) of the Patent Act, which 
renders inapplicable the exemption to the tying policies pursued by a dominant firm.  It is 
also unclear whether Subsection (5) applies to Xeroxs behavior.  Subsection (5) allows two 
conflicting interpretations.  Xerox argued that Subsection (5) was not applicable because it 
only applies to tying agreements but not to a unilateral conditioning of a license on the 
purchasing of another product.  See Brief of Defendant-Appellee Xerox Corporation 25-32, 
In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. (CSU, L.L.C.  v. Xerox Corp.), No.  99-1323 (Fed. 
Cir. filed July 14, 1999).  Scholars have conflicting views on the correct interpretation of 
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According to the district court, the Ninth Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion because it implicitly assumed that a single patent 
could create a single inherent antitrust monopoly.671 This premise 
is incorrect.  A patent right can implicate multiple antitrust markets, 
and the reward of the patented invention is the right to exploit the 
entire field of the invention, not just the right to exploit the single 
most analogous antitrust market.672 
The Federal Circuit again affirmed the district court decision.673  
Unlike the district court, which merely referred to Data General, the 
Federal Circuit relied on it.674  The Federal Circuit, however, gives 
the rebuttable presumption set out in Data General a restrictive 
interpretation.675  The Federal Circuit seems to have limited the 
possibility of rebutting the presumption to situations of misuse or 
unlawful acquisition of IP, while the First Circuit in Data General 
did not seem to limit to misuse claims the grounds where the plaintiff 
may rebut the presumption.676  Like the district court, the Federal 
Circuit expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit, because its 
rationale requires an evaluation of the patentees subjective 
motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented products.677  
The court acknowledges that the patentees right to exclude is not 
without limit.678  However, it is in the identification of such limits 
that the Federal Circuit in Xerox differs with the Ninth Circuit.679 
 
 
Subsection (5).  While Professor Patterson disagrees with Xeroxs interpretation of 
Subsection (5), arguing that there is no indication that Subsection (5) was intended to 
apply only to explicit tying agreements, Professor Hovenkamp suggests that the absence of a 
contract implies the absence of conditioning with the meaning of Subsection (5).  See 
Patterson supra note 254, at 1149-51; HOVENKAMP, supra note 574, at 331. 
 671 In re Indep. Serv., 989 F. Supp. at 1138. 
 672 Id.; see HOVENKAMP, supra note 600, at 330-31, n. 51. 
 673 In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 674 Id. at 1328-29. 
 675 Id. at 1329; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 
1994). 
 676 Id. at 1329; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 
1994). 
 677 Indep. Serv., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
 678 Id. at 1326. 
 679 Id. at 1326-28. 
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For the Federal Circuit, a compulsory license cannot be ordered, 
unless the plaintiff proves at least one of the following conditions: (i) 
the defendant obtained its patent through fraud; (ii) the infringement 
suit is objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by a desire to 
impose collateral, anticompetitive injury, rather than to obtain a 
justifiable legal remedy (sham litigation); or (iii) the patent was used 
as part of an illegal tying strategy to extend market power beyond the 
legitimate scope of the patent grant.680  The plaintiff in the Xerox 
case proved none of these conditions.681  Thus, the court ruled that 
absent these exceptional circumstances, the antitrust defendants 
subjective motivation is irrelevant even though its refusal to sell or 
license its patented invention may have anticompetitive effects.682 
The Federal Circuit referred then to footnote 29 of the Supreme 
Courts decision in Kodak I,683 and held that its language does 
nothing to limit the right of the patentee to sell or license in markets 
within the scope of the statutory patent grant.684  Further, absent 
exceptional circumstances a patent may confer the right to exclude 
competition in more than one antitrust market.685  The Federal 
Circuit gave a clearer interpretation of footnote 29 than the district 
court did.686  It attempted to reconcile the Supreme Courts statement 
with its ruling in the Xerox case.687  The Federal Circuit held that the 
words in footnote 29 could be interpreted as restating the 
undisputed premise that the patent holder cannot use his statutory 
right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market 
beyond the scope of the patent.688 (emphasis added).  The Federal 
Circuit narrowly interpreted the meaning of beyond the scope of the 
patent by holding that Xeroxs refusal to license its replacement 
parts did not go beyond the scope of the patent because, absent 
exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer the right to exclude 
 
 680 Id. at 1327-28. 
 681 Id. at 1327. 
 682 Id. at 1327-28. 
 683 Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479, n. 29 (1992). 
 684 Indep. Serv., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
 685 Id. 
 686 Id. 
 687 Id. 
 688 Id. 
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competition altogether in more than one antitrust market.689 
The difference between the Xerox decision of the Federal Circuit 
and the Data General and Kodak II decisions is that the Federal 
Circuit has created a rule stating that absent those exceptional 
circumstances which relate to unlawful acquisition, misuse, or illegal 
tying, the use of IPRs is immune from antitrust laws.690  It is worth 
pointing out that neither the Commission nor the EC Courts have yet 
to issue a decision expressly acknowledging that the use of IPRs is 
immune from antitrust liability. 
It is premature to speculate on the impact of the Federal Circuits 
Xerox opinion on lower courts.  At least one district court has already 
relied on the Federal Circuits opinion.  In Townshend v. Rockwell 
Intl Corp.,691 the holder of several basic patents over the technology 
underlying 56k modems692 sued Rockwell for patent infringement.693  
The defendant launched antitrust counterclaims alleging that, inter 
alia: Townshend and one of its licensees conspired to fraudulently 
obtain the patents; the licensing terms were unfair because (i) 
Townshend sought unfair royalty rates; (ii) the licenses were granted 
on condition that licensees cross-license their technology to 
Townshend; and (iii) Townshend conditioned its licenses on the 
resolution of litigation.694  The District Court for the Northern 
District of California relied on, among other cases, the Federal 
Circuits Xerox opinion and dismissed Rockwells counterclaims.695  
The district court recalled that the Federal Circuit held in Xerox that 
the antitrust laws do not negate a patentees right to exclude others 
from patent property.696  Pursuant to this premise, the court held 
 
 689 Id. 
 690 Id. at 1327-28; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d. 1147 (1st 
Cir. 1994). 
 691 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,890, at 87,629 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 692 A modem is a device that allows computer users to connect their electronic 
equipment to telephone networks. Id. at 87,629.  The 56kps refer to the maximum speed at 
which a modem allows such interconnection to take place.  Id.  According to the definition 
of the district court, 56kps modem technology allows a computer user to access information 
at 56,000 bits per second.  Id. 
 693 Id. at 87,629. 
 694 Id. at 87,630. 
 695 Id. at 87,633. 
 696 Id. 
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that, because a patent owner has the legal right to refuse to license 
its patent on any terms, the existence of a predicate condition to a 
license agreement cannot state an antitrust violation.697 
IV. A NEW THEORY TO IDENTIFY SITUATIONS THAT MAY WARRANT 
THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO REFUSALS TO LICENSE 
None of the approaches adopted in the U.S. and the EU toward the 
possible application of the essential facilities doctrine to refusals to 
license is satisfactory.  In the EU, if the Magill doctrine is broadly 
interpreted, a dominant IP owner might be required to license its 
IPRs to allow a competitor to introduce a new product that would 
compete with its own.  This implies that the defendant could be 
compelled to create its own competition, thereby reducing the value 
of its IPRs.  In the U.S., Xerox confines the application of antitrust 
laws concerning refusals to license to those cases where the plaintiff 
proves the defendants unlawful acquisition or misuse of  IPRs.698  
This is a very formalistic approach.  It does not take into account 
extreme situations, beyond misuse, where the refusal to license an 
IPR could seriously harm competition.699  In contrast to the quasi-
antitrust immunity advocated in Xerox, the FTC and some courts 
are less sensitive to the protection of IPRs.  Under this more 
restrictive approach antitrust law may be applicable to refusals to 
license either on the basis of the probable harm caused by the 
alleged anticompetitive conduct in innovation markets (FTC/Intel 
and Microsoft), or on the basis of the subjective intent of the 
defendant (Kodak II). 
Those theories that, on the grounds of the protection of innovation 
markets, favor compulsory licensing based on a hypothetical and 
speculative analysis of the future consequences of the refusal to 
license in the innovation markets are unsatisfactory.  Likewise, the 
 
 697 Id. at 87,634. 
 698 In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135-36 (D. Kan. 1997), 
affd, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 699 The Xerox ruling has been strongly criticized by some officials of the FTC as 
upsetting the traditional balance between intellectual property and antitrust laws.  Pitofsky, 
supra note 260. 
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introduction of a subjective-intent test to rebut the presumption that a 
refusal to license is a valid business justification may lead to 
significant mistakes, since the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate motives is not entirely clear when a holder refuses to 
license its IPRs.700  In light of the shortcomings of the approaches 
endorsed by antitrust authorities and courts, it is necessary to 
formulate an intermediate theory to allow companies in the U.S. and 
the EU to identify situations in which it is justified to require a 
proprietor to license its IPRs to a competitor in order to avoid 
antitrust liability. 
Any theory that is developed to address the interaction between 
intellectual property laws and antitrust laws must be based on the 
premise that compulsory licensing should be ordered only in very 
limited circumstances.  It is also essential to require that, whenever 
the antitrust authorities and courts in the EU and the U.S. require 
compulsory licensing, the plaintiff or the complainant must prove the 
existence of a real risk of suffering competitive harm, whether actual 
or potential.  Compulsory licensing cannot be made dependent on the 
subjective intent of the owner, or on the probable remote effects of 
the challenged behavior in innovation markets, but rather on proving 
objectively that the challenged exclusionary or predatory conduct 
attributed to the IP owner has, or may reasonably have, the effect of 
harming competition. 
Without being exhaustive, one may foresee at least one situation 
where the application of the essential facilities doctrine to a refusal to 
deal may be adequate.  If a company, already owning the leading 
IPRs in the market, undertakes a policy to aggressively and 
systematically buy up every patent that comes along in the relevant 
market, and accumulates a very important cluster of patents which 
becomes a bottleneck for a third party to enter or remain in the 
market, then this third party could rely on the essential facilities 
doctrine to force the owner to license its technology.701 
It is unclear, however, whether in practice this is a viable cause of 
action in the EU and the U.S..  Supreme Court jurisprudence is not 
 
 700 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 193, 202. 
 701 SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 114, at 711. 
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entirely clear on the question of antitrust liability for patent 
accumulation.702  In Transparent-Wrap Machine Corporation v. 
Stokes & Smith,703 the Court suggested that patent accumulation 
might be subject to antitrust liability: As patents are added to 
patents a whole industry may be regimented.  The owner of a basic 
patent might thus perpetuate his control over an industry long after 
the basic patent expired.  Competitors might be eliminated and an 
industrial monopoly perfected and maintained.704  The Court, 
however, appears to have reached the opposite conclusion just three 
years later in Automatic Radio Manufacturing. v. Hazeltine 
Resources,705 where it held that the mere accumulation of patents, 
no matter how many is not a Sherman Act violation.706 
It is also difficult to anticipate the reaction of the Commission and 
the EC Courts towards a cumulative patent complaint.  Although 
Tetra Pak I was not an essential facilities case, the position of the 
Commission invites observers to infer that the Commission would be 
receptive toward a complaint of a company against a firm 
accumulating patents with an exclusionary purpose.707  In Tetra Pak 
I, the Commission found that Tetra Pak had abused its dominant 
position by the acquisition of a competitors exclusive license 
(Liquipak) over an important technology relating to a new UHT 
milk-packaging process.708  It is important to note that Elopak, one of 
the only two companies capable of competing in the EC with Tetra 
Pak, had contributed to the development of this new technology.709  
The Commissions decision concluded that the right to use the 
 
 702 Kobak, supra note 69, at 543.  Kobak points out that in the U.S. neither the existing 
case law nor the IP Guidelines have addressed the issue of under what circumstances (if 
any) an aggregation of intellectual property rights held by an individual firm may be 
regarded as an essential facility that must be licensed to all competition on reasonable terms.  
Id.  at 543. 
 703 329 U.S. 637 (1947). 
 704 Id. at 647. 
 705 339 U.S. 827 (1950). 
 706 Id. at 834. 
 707 Commission. Decision 88/501/EEC, [1988] O.J.  (L 272) ¶ 27.  The CFI upheld the 
Commissions decision in Tetra Pak Rausing v. Commission, Case T-51/89, 1990 E.C.R. II-
309. 
 708 Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing v. Commission., 1990 E.C.R. II-309, 351, ¶ 8 
(1990). 
 709 Id. at II-349, ¶ 5. 
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process protected by the exclusive license was alone capable of 
giving an undertaking the means of competing effectively with 
[Tetra Pak] in the field of aseptic packaging of milk.710  Thus, by 
acquiring this exclusive license, Tetra Pak strengthened its 
dominance711 in the market for machines and materials for the 
aseptic packaging of milk and prevented, or delayed considerably, 
the entry of a new competitor in a market where there was already 
little competition.712 
Finally, one may wonder which theory should be adopted if 
antitrust authorities and/or courts were to decide to set aside the pro-
immunity approach and the subjective-intent approach, as outlined in 
the U.S. by the Xerox and the Kodak II opinions respectively.713  
Despite not having been adopted by any U.S. court, and despite the 
doubts that it poses regarding the balance between incentives and the 
application of antitrust laws to IPRs, Professor Pattersons use-
oriented approach714 might be at least a useful and clear method to 
identify those situations where an IP owner may be forced under the 
essential facilities doctrine to license its IPRs to its competitors.715  
This, of course, does not diminish the view that courts should always 
be extremely careful when ordering the compulsory licensing of an 
IPR. 
In summary, absent a deliberate accumulation of IPRs or, should 
Professor Pattersons theory be adopted by antitrust authorities and 
courts, absent a refusal unrelated to the use of the intellectual 
property, a unilateral refusal to deal should not be subject to antitrust 
liability except when IPRs have been misused or unlawfully 
obtained.  If antitrust authorities and courts extend the essential 
facilities doctrine beyond these situations, the effect of a compulsory 
license would be to force the IP owner to create its own competition.  
This is not the goal that antitrust laws should pursue and it is in stark 
 
 710 Commission. Decision 88/501/EEC, [1988] O.J.  (L 272) ¶ 27. 
 711 Tetra Pak had 91.8% of the EC market in aseptic filling machines and 89.1% of the 
market in the relevant cartons.  Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak I, 1990 E.C.R. at II-312-13, ¶ 3. 
 712 Commission. Decision 88/501/EEC, [1988] O.J.  (L 272) ¶ 27, ¶¶ 45, 60. 
 713 In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135-36 (D. Kan. 1997), 
affd, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1215. 
 714 Patterson, supra note 254, at 1146-47. 
 715 See discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
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conflict with the very essence of IPRs.  The main function of 
antitrust laws should not be to compel firms to maximize 
competition, but to prevent them from restricting it.716 
Patent accumulation or a refusal unrelated to the use of the 
intellectual property could justify the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine to a refusal to license IPRs.  However, this would 
be dangerous advice, especially in the U.S.  Though attorneys 
generally should not suggest this course of action firmly to a client, it 
may be an approach worth considering. 
CONCLUSION 
IPRs in the EU and U.S. were previously unscathed by antitrust 
liability.  The situation has slightly changed, and IPRs are now open 
to antitrust liability.  In recent years, both in the EU and U.S., 
significant antitrust inroads have been made into the IPR domain 
introducing legal uncertainty for IPR owners.  Despite these inroads, 
the application of the essential facilities doctrine or the monopoly 
leveraging doctrine to refusals to license has occurred only in 
exceptional cases.  Nothing indicates that compulsory licenses based 
on U.S. antitrust law or EC competition law will become 
commonplace.717  This should allay the fears of those who might 
interpret cases such as Magill, FTC/Intel or Kodak II as heralding the 
erosion of the privileged status of IPRs.718 
In the U.S., with the exception of the Ninth Circuits Kodak II 
opinion, there appears to be no reported case in which a court has 
imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to license IPRs.  
The recent judgment of the Federal Circuit in the Intel case shows 
the reluctance of U.S. courts to issue compulsory licensing orders.  In 
the EUs Magill case, the Commission imposed upon a company the 
duty to license its copyright to another company competing in a 
downstream market.  The potentially severe impact of this case on 
IPRs, however, has been neutralized by the narrow interpretation 
 
 716 U.S.M Corp. v. SPS Tech. Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 717 Forrester, supra note 47, at 35-12. 
 718 Fitzgerald, supra note 391, at 161. 
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given to it by the Commission and the CFI, and it is not likely to be 
repeated.  For this reason, there is now more legal certainty in the EU 
than in the U.S.  for owners of IPRs who refuse to license them to 
actual or potential competitors.  In the U.S., the Federal Circuit 
(Xerox), the Ninth Circuit (Kodak II), and the Federal Circuit and the 
FTC in the Intel case, have reached opposite conclusions as to 
whether the exercise of IPRs is immune from antitrust laws. 
Both in the EU and U.S. the issue of how intellectual property 
laws and antitrust laws should interrelate is still unresolved.  There 
are several different mechanisms to reconcile these fields of law.  
Jurisprudence should develop a clear legal theory regarding this 
issue, and in the U.S. the problem is ripe for consideration by the 
Supreme Court.719  Legislators may also enact statutory provisions 
regulating this relationship to avoid the legal uncertainty created by 
the jurisprudence on both sides of the Atlantic.720 
Finally, frictions between intellectual property laws and antitrust 
laws could also be alleviated, especially regarding patents and 
similar rights, by narrowing the scope of the claims so that patents do 
not cover basic research tools which may be used by potential 
competitors.721 By doing so, competitors would be less prone to  
 
 719 Freed, supra note 310, at 37. 
 720 See Antonio F. Pérez, DOJs New Antitrust Paradigm Resurrects Outdated 
Economics, 7  ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 18.  This scholar has pointed out that, given 
that the cost for the computer industry of a wrong decision by the judiciary in the Microsoft 
case is likely to be high, the DOJ should have never brought the Microsoft case without 
additional policy guidance from the legislative branch.  Id. 
 721 See John H.  Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth 
and Sequential Innovation, 2 ANTITRUST 65, 449 (1997).  This scholar points out that in 
some fields, like biotechnology, patents are very broad and may cover basic research tools.  
Id.  This concern about broad patents may also be related to computer software.  In a 
groundbreaking case, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit held that computer software is patentable 
subject matter.  Id.  Therefore, firms may now attempt to claim broad software patents to 
gain a competitive advantage over their competitors who, in turn, could rely on the essential 
facilities doctrine to gain compulsory access to patented software.  See Christopher S. 
Cantzler, State Street: Leading the Way to Consistency for Patentability of Computer 
Software, 71 U. COLO. L.  REV. 423, 424 (2000); see also Suzanne Scotchmer, Cumulative 
Innovation in Theory and Practice, GSPP Working Paper 240, U.C. Berkeley, at 16-18 
(February 1999), available at  http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/ip.html (last visited Mar. 
9, 2001) (regarding the effects of broad patents in innovation markets). 
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request compulsory access to a patent right, and therefore, antitrust 
laws would be invoked less frequently to interfere with IPRs. 
 
